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SWEARING IN THE PHOENIX:
TOWARD A MORE SENSIBLE SYSTEM FOR
SEATING MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AT ORGANIZATION
BRIAN C. KALT*
Under U.S. House precedent, any member-elect can challenge the right of
any other member-elect to take the oath of office at the beginning of a new term.
The uncontested members-elect then swear in and decide the fate of those who
were forced to stand aside. If the House is closely divided and there are
disputed elections at the margins, a minority party could exploit this procedure
to try to seize control of the House.
This would be outrageous and damaging, even if the effort failed.
Contending for ultimate control, both sides could level motions, appeals, and
tit-for-tat pre-oath challenges. The proto-House would degenerate into a
chaotic mass of votes, meta-votes (about who gets to vote), and meta-meta-votes
before anyone has even been sworn in. Instead of the House being controlled
by the party that won the most seats in the election, it might go instead to the
party that is most disciplined and unified—or, failing that, to the party that is
more adept at parliamentary machinations.
This nightmare is not completely hypothetical; the House once witnessed a
power grab much like this—and it succeeded. But even an unsuccessful attempt
could worsen the national partisan divide, weaken the House’s legitimacy, and
threaten the House’s already dangerously low levels of comity. So could an
attempt by a majority to bolster its advantage by a seat or two.

* Professor of Law and Harold Norris Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University College of
Law. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Reb Brownell, Josh Chafetz, Derek Muller, Jorge E. Souss, Max
Spitzer (in his personal capacity), Michael Stern, and James Wallner for their helpful feedback.
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This Article proposes to avoid this danger by rejecting this precedent. The
House used a sensible “Oaths First” process for many decades, starting with
the First Congress in 1789. The current, problematic “Step Aside” process
only arose in the 1860s, for reasons that were either ill-considered, are no
longer applicable, or both. The House has not used the Step Aside process in
recent decades, but given the way House precedent functions, the Step Aside
needs to be discarded, not just disused. This Article seeks to nudge the House
into a more careful, considered, and consistent practice, re-embracing the
Oaths First procedure officially and definitively.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The House of Representatives, like the United States as a whole, is deeply
divided. High-stakes hardball politics reign in the Capitol. The public
legitimacy of elections is under threat; Republicans trumpet claims of voter
fraud, while Democrats complain about voter suppression. Add to this an
obscure point of House of Representatives procedure—the subject of this
Article—and the House is vulnerable to a constitutional breakdown.
Consider this hypothetical scenario:
*
The election yields a razor-thin margin in the House. After weeks of hotly
contested, controversial recounts in several districts, the Silver Party has a 218
to 217 majority over the Purple Party.1 The House convenes on January 3 and
narrowly elects a Silver Speaker of the House.
But before the Speaker can administer the oath to the others, a Purple
representative-elect unexpectedly steps forward to object to two Silvers
swearing in. Challenging the election results—two of the closest and messiest
contests in the country—the objector invokes House precedent that would force
the two Silvers to stand aside while the rest of the representatives-elect take
their oaths. Once sworn in, the 433 representatives would vote on who is
entitled to the two disputed seats.
The Purple plan is obvious: the 433 seated members would have a 217 to
216 Purple majority. The Purple majority would vote to hold the two disputed
seats open while the House conducts its own recount, or maybe even to seat the

1. Fictional party names are used here because everything could happen with either Democrats
or Republicans in the majority.
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two Purple challengers in the interim. Either way, the Purples would take over
the House and replace the Silver Speaker with a Purple one.
On the other hand, if the precedent is rejected and the two challenged
members are not forced to stand aside . . .
*
It would be outrageous for a party to try to seize control of the House this
way. Unfortunately, if conditions were just so, it is not hard to imagine either
party launching such an attempt.2
Things could unravel further. Contending for ultimate control, both sides
could level motions, appeals, and tit-for-tat pre-oath challenges against each
other’s members-elect. The proto-House could degenerate into a chaotic mass
of votes, meta-votes (about who gets to vote), and meta-meta-votes before
anyone has even been sworn in. Instead of the House being controlled by the
party that won the most seats in the election, it might go instead to the party
that is more disciplined and unified—or, failing that, to the party that is more
adept at parliamentary machinations.
Our hypothetical scenario is not completely hypothetical; the House once
witnessed a power grab much like this, and it succeeded.3 Shifting a few seats
at the start of a term could also affect the resolution of a disputed presidential
election.4 But even an unsuccessful attempt could worsen the national partisan
divide, weaken the House’s legitimacy, and threaten the House’s already
dangerously low levels of comity.5 So could an attempt by a majority to bolster
its advantage by a seat or two.6
The root of the problem is House precedent, which empowers an individual
unsworn member-elect to keep colleagues from being seated simply by leveling
unsubstantiated objections against them. This Article rejects that practice and
argues that, instead, everyone with valid credentials should take the oath. Only
after that—when the House has fully become the House—should the House
process objections regarding the elections and qualifications of its members.

2. Nobody knows which party will control the House in the future, or by how much. As such,
this Article makes its suggestions without any sense that one particular party would benefit from them.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (extolling the virtues of employing such
“veils of ignorance”).
3. See infra Section III.A.iv (describing 1839 case).
4. As the controversy over counting electoral votes in January 2021 showed, the House has an
important role under the Electoral Count Act of 1887. See 3 U.S.C. § 15. An even higher-stakes
situation would be a contingent election, in which nobody wins a majority in the Electoral College and
the president is selected by the House. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
5. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 143–45 (describing 1863 case).
6. Cf. infra Sections III.D.i, III.D.iii (describing 1961 and 1985 cases).

KALT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SWEARING IN THE PHOENIX

5

Among other benefits, cementing this procedure would dissuade people from
attempting the maneuvers described above.
This Article’s proposal tracks the “Oaths First” process the House used
successfully for many decades, starting with the First Congress in 1789. The
current, problematic “Step Aside” process only arose in the 1860s, for reasons
that were either ill-considered, are no longer applicable, or both.
The House has rarely used the Step Aside procedure, and has not used it at
all in recent decades.7 In 2021, the unsworn members-elect voted down a
symbolic attempt to force dozens of members-elect to step aside, by a vote of
371–2.8 But the Step Aside precedent hangs in the House chamber like
Chekhov’s gun, waiting inevitably to be employed.9 It needs to be discarded,
not just disused. This Article seeks to nudge the House into a more careful,
considered, and consistent practice, throwing away the “gun” and re-embracing
the Oaths First procedure officially and definitively.
Part I of the Article provides constitutional background information and
describes the House’s current procedures for seating members at the opening
of each new term. Part II provides a detailed history: the House’s initial
embrace of the Oaths First process; its eventual descent into the Step Aside
process; and recent practice that has stopped using—but not repudiated—the
Step Aside process. Part III presents the proposal in more detail. Part IV
concludes by examining some principles and practicalities that provide
additional support for bolstering the Oaths First process.
II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT PROCEDURES
A. The Inherent Problem
At the root of this Article’s discussion is the chicken-and-egg problem
presented for the House of Representatives by the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications Clause. That clause provides that “[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”10
The fundamental question is, Who is the “House” here?

7. See infra Sections III.D–E.
8. 167 CONG. REC. H7–8 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2021).
9. Playwright Anton Chekhov famously advised, “If in Act 1 you have a pistol hanging on the
wall, then it must fire in the last act.” DONALD RAYFIELD, ANTON CHEKHOV: A LIFE 203 (1998).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. The constitutional qualifications for office include age,
citizenship, residency, and loyalty requirements. See id. § 2, cl. 2; id. amend. XIV, § 3.
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Every two years, at noon on January 3, all 435 members of the old House
see their terms end.11 So how does each new House establish itself ex nihilo—
like a phoenix from the ashes? When does the House of Representatives decide
who is in the House of Representatives?12 This part of the Article explains the
House’s current procedures.
B. Current Practice
The transitional time at the outset of a new term, during which the House
of Representatives is not yet fully formed, is called “organization.”13 The new
House has no formal rules at that point; it proceeds according to general
parliamentary principles and past practices.14 This allows unsworn memberselect—to some extent—to speak, make motions, and vote on those motions.15
In order to reconstitute itself, the House relies on the Clerk of the House of
Representatives appointed by the previous House. Unlike the representatives
who appointed the Clerk, the Clerk does not see her powers expire
automatically on January 3 at noon.16
The Clerk’s work in this regard actually begins back in September; before
the election, their office communicates with state authorities about what the

11. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for biennial selection of House members); id. amend. XX, § 1
(indicating the time and hour of a term’s end).
12. Unlike the House, the Senate is a continuing body; while all representatives see their terms
expire at once, only one-third of senators do. See id. art. I, § 3. The Senate thus avoids the technical
challenges of periodic rebirth that present the House with the challenges explored in this Article. Cf.
Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications, Elections,
and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J. 241, 294–95 & 295 n.345 (2006) (describing Senate’s typical
process as seating first and adjudging qualifications later). The House also avoids these problems when
it decides on seating representatives elected in the middle of the term—another area this Article does
not cover.
13. See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, JOHN V. SULLIVAN & THOMAS J. WICKMAN, JR., HOUSE
PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 5, § 4, at 158–60 (2017) [hereinafter HOUSE PRACTICE].
14. See THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, § 60, at 27–28 (2019)
[hereinafter HOUSE MANUAL]; see also 6 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 3383–85, at 829–31 (1935); 5 ASHER C.
HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, § 6761,
at 888 (1907).
15. See HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, ch. 5, § 4, at 159–60; id. § 7, at 162–63.
16. See 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 187, at 110, 112; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, at ch. 5,
§ 4, at 158–59; 1 CHARLES W. JOHNSON, III, JOHN V. SULLIVAN & THOMAS J. WICKHAM, JR.,
PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. 115-62, ch. 1, § 3, at
21–23 (2017) [hereinafter HOUSE PRECEDENTS].
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states must do to certify and submit their election results properly.17 After the
November election, states submit their certified results and the Clerk’s office
reviews them to ensure that they comply with state law.18 If a certificate is
inadequate, and if time permits, the Clerk’s office notifies that state and directs
it to correct and re-send its certification.19
Proper certification serves as the “credentials” for the person elected.20 On
January 3 (or a later day if the previous Congress has so legislated), the Clerk
places on the “roll of the [r]epresentatives-elect” those people whose states have
submitted proper credentials for them.21 These credentials are the “returns”
referred to in the Constitution when it empowers the House to judge the
“elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.”22
After noon on opening day, with the Clerk presiding, those on the roll vote
to elect the Speaker of the House.23 Next, a representative-elect (traditionally
the most senior) administers the oath of office to the Speaker, who then
administers the oath to the other representatives-elect.24 When they have taken
their oaths, they become seated representatives.25 It is only at that point, with
a quorum sworn in, that the House can “enter[] on any other business.”26

17. See Telephone Interview by Jane Meland with Robert Borden, Legal Couns., Off. of the
Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Borden Interview].
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See 2 U.S.C. § 26; 1 HOUSE PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 2, at 174; U.S. CONST.
amend. XX, § 2 (directing Congress to assemble on January 3, unless it chooses a different day). The
Clerk’s task is supposed to be ministerial; proper credentials should guarantee one a place on the roll.
But the validity of someone’s credentials may be in dispute, and the Clerk may need to exercise some
discretion. See infra Section V.A.ii.a.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The distinction between elections and returns
can be confusing, but in essence, judging the “return” is evaluating the adequacy of the documentation
certifying that one has been elected, while judging the “election” is determining who ought to have
been named on the return as the winner. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1839) (comments
of Rep.-Elect Crabb).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2; HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 641, at 368;
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30725, THE FIRST DAY OF A NEW CONGRESS: A
GUIDE TO PROCEEDINGS ON THE HOUSE FLOOR 3 (2020).
24. See 2 U.S.C. § 25. The statute, which dates back to 1789, refers to everyone here as a
representative, not a representative-elect. See also DAVIS, supra note 23, at 4–5; 1 HOUSE
PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, at ch. 2, § 3, at 180–81.
25. A representative is considered a representative-elect until sworn in. See 1 HOUSE
PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 1, at 161–62. Cf. HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 300, at 145
(“[A] Member . . . cannot vote until he is sworn”).
26. 2 U.S.C. § 25.
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Having valid credentials is generally treated as prima facie evidence that
one is entitled to take the oath of office.27 Sometimes, though, there are
challenges to someone’s election or qualifications. In such cases, the most
common practice—what this Article calls the Oaths First process—is to allow
the person with valid credentials to take the oath, and to handle the challenge
later, after the House has been constituted properly.28 In other words, all
members-elect take their oaths on the basis of the prima facie evidence, but
their final right to hold their seats may be subject to later adjudication by the
House.29 Most challenges to a member’s seat follow the procedures set out in
the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA).30
On some such occasions, however, a member-elect has lodged an objection
prior to the oath, and the challenged member-elect has been made to step aside
as everyone else was sworn in.31 Under current House precedent, this sort of
objection is a way for the House to obtain jurisdiction outside the FCEA
process.32 The undesirability of this practice—the Step Aside process—is this
Article’s focus.
When a member-elect is forced to step aside, the newly sworn-in House
decides what to do with the challenged member-elect, usually immediately.33
In rare instances, the House has opted not to seat the person being challenged.34
Typically, though, the House quickly seats challenged people, with an
understanding that further review might unseat them.35
27. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33780, PROCEDURES FOR CONTESTED
ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2, 8, 10 (2016).
28. See 1 HOUSE PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 4, at 214; Borden Interview, supra note
17.
29. See 1 HOUSE PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 4, at 214.
30. 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96; see WHITAKER, supra note 27, at 2–3.
31. See 6 CANNON, supra note 14 , § 3386, at 831–33; 1 LEWIS DESCHLER, PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. 94-661, ch. 2, § 6.1, at 130–31 (1994); 2 id. ch. 7, § 9.1, at
747–48; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, ch. 33, § 3, at 652; 1 HOUSE PRECEDENTS, supra note 16,
ch. 2, § 4, at 214; DAVIS, supra note 23, at 5; see also HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 203, at 88
(noting that “[i]t has been held, although not uniformly” that the Speaker can direct the challenged
member-elect to step aside).
32. See HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, ch. 22, § 2, at 492; WHITAKER, supra note 27, at 3–4,
9–11; cf. 2 DESCHLER, supra note 31, ch. 9, § 4, at 984 (saying that “the House may initiate an election
investigation if a Member-elect’s right to take the oath is challenged by another Member” but not
saying that this is the only possible timing for a non-FCEA challenge); id. ch. 8, § 16, at 951 (making
a similar statement). Since 1933, about 6% of contested elections have been handled this way. See
WHITAKER, supra note 27, at 10.
33. See 1 DESCHLER, supra note 31, ch. 2, § 6, at 128; 2 id. ch. 7, § 9, at 743; 1 HOUSE
PRECEDENTS, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 4, at 214; DAVIS, supra note 23, at 5.
34. See WHITAKER, supra note 27, at 10.
35. See id.
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The Step Aside process should be disavowed. It serves no positive purpose.
As a matter of history, law, order, and fairness, it is preferable—and potentially
important—to use the Oaths First process consistently.
III. HISTORICAL PRACTICES
The House’s historical seating practices reveal several things. First and
foremost, the Oaths First process works just fine. It worked just fine for the
first several decades of the Republic, and it has worked just fine since then on
those occasions when the House has used it—which has been most of the time.
Second, the Step Aside process should be rejected. It solves no problems
that could not be solved better by the Oaths First process. The Step Aside
process arose out of confusion and was based on conditions that no longer
apply. To the extent that the Step Aside process served any purposes in the
past, it does not serve them today.
Third, the full panoply of cases offers lots of nuance, including some
exceptional situations in which unsworn members-elect should make decisions,
and in which it is appropriate not to seat people who have come to swear in. A
survey of this history suggests some helpful details to add to flesh out the Oaths
First process.
A. The Center Holds (1789–1859)
Starting in 1789, the first several decades of House practice showed how
well the Oaths First process can work. This was true even though administering
elections was more difficult back then than it is today. The antebellum period
revealed the limits of the Oaths First process, but it also showed what can go
wrong when the House takes a different approach.
i. The First Congress (1789)
When the First Congress assembled in 1789, it was an exercise in selfconstitution. The new House had no incumbent members or leaders, no rules
or statutes guiding its behavior, and no internal precedents.
The first thing the assembled representatives-elect did upon attaining a
quorum on April 1 was to elect a Speaker.36 Next, they appointed a Clerk.37
Then, they submitted their credentials—the certifications of their elections—to
that Clerk.38

36. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 96 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
37. See id.
38. See id.
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It is understandable that the assembled members chose a Speaker and Clerk
before doing anything else, because the orderly conduct of business required it.
But at that point, nobody had verified the elections, returns, or qualifications of
any of the members present, and none of those members had met the
constitutional requirement of taking an oath to support the Constitution.39
Having un-scrutinized, unsworn members select the Speaker made sense on that
occasion, but it set a precedent which has been followed ever since despite
being awkward.40
Soon after selecting a Speaker and a Clerk, the House appointed a
committee to propose legislation regulating oaths.41 It also passed a resolution
on a preliminary oath that its members could take in the meantime, which they
did on April 8.42 On April 27, the House approved permanent legislation on
oaths.43 After the Senate agreed, President Washington signed the bill into law
on June 1, the first federal law passed under the new Constitution.44
Under the law (still in force today in substantially the same form), at the
start of a new term the Speaker administers the oath to all the members present,
“previous to entering on any other business.”45 This cemented the practice of
selecting a Speaker before anyone had been sworn in.
Significantly for this Article’s purposes, there were disputes over
representatives’ elections and qualifications during this period, but these were
treated as the sort of “other business” that was handled only after everyone had
sworn in.
One case, involving South Carolina Representative William Smith, is not
directly relevant to this Article; Smith did not appear until April 13, so he was

39. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
40. The Constitution says that “the House” selects “their Speaker and other Officers.” Id. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 6. It is awkward when members-elect participate in the Speaker election only to be challenged
and denied their seats later. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 201–02 (describing 1877
organization). In subsequent Houses, moreover, the officers other than the Speaker—the Clerk, the
Sergeant at Arms, and so on—are chosen only after organization. See DAVIS, supra note 23, at 6.
41. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 97 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Other actions the House took
before anyone was sworn in (in the First Congress but not since) included making its standing rules,
selecting its officers, and helping to count the electoral votes for President. See id. at 97–102.
42. See id. at 97 (resolving the preliminary oath’s content); id. at 101–02 (resolving that the
preliminary oath would be administered by the Chief Justice of New York, and taking the oath); David
P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789–
1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 170 (1995).
43. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 207 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
44. Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23 (1789); see 1 Stat. xvii (1789) (listing legislation
chronologically); 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 129, at 84.
45. 1 Stat. 23. See 2 U.S.C. § 25 and historical and statutory notes.
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not part of the initial group that took the oath on April 8.46 He bears mention,
though, as his was the House’s first qualifications case. On April 15, the House
considered a petition alleging that Smith had not been a citizen for the required
seven-year period.47 The case was referred to the newly appointed Committee
of Elections.48 On April 18, the committee reported two things: it had examined
the credentials of everyone serving in the House (presumably including Smith)
and found them adequate; and it had come up with a procedure for handling
Smith’s qualifications case.49 On May 22, after lengthy debate, the House
rejected the petition against Smith and confirmed him in his seat.50 In the
meantime, Smith had had his credentials validated, sworn his oath, and
participated in House business.51 The “principle” of Smith’s case, as a 1973
House committee put it, “is that the House decided that a member-elect was
entitled to a seat on his prima facie right [i.e., because he had valid credentials],
although knowing that his qualifications were under examination.”52
A second case handled an election dispute the same way. The House
received “sundry petitions” from New Jersey on April 28 challenging the
elections of its representatives.53 Over the next few months, the Committee of
Elections and the full House wrestled with procedural questions and with the
merits until, on September 2, the House accepted New Jersey’s certified
46. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 102 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording those taking the
initial oath on April 8, including William Smith of Maryland); id. at 121 (recording the appearance of
William Smith of South Carolina).
47. See id. at 143; M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS
IN CONGRESS FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 23–37 (Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton
1834) (providing the details of Smith’s case).
48. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 122–23 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (explaining Committee of
Elections function and recording its appointment); id. at 143 (recording the referral of Smith’s case to
the committee).
49. See id. at 167–68.
50. See id. at 397–408; CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 24–37; Currie, supra note 42, at 173–
74.
51. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 160, 259–61, 286–87, 336, 351–52, 371–72, 376–77 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834) (showing Smith’s participation); id. at 167–68 (showing approval of Smith’s
credentials); 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 420, at 391 (noting that Rep. Smith had voted on May 16,
“showing conclusively that he had taken the oath while the question as to his qualifications was
pending”).
52. JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS, 93D CONG., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EXCLUSION, CENSURE AND EXPULSION CASES FROM 1789 TO 1973, at 4 (Comm. Print 1973)
[hereinafter EXCLUSION CASES].
53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see id. at 231, 343 (referring these
and related petitions to the Committee of Elections). New Jersey’s governor had certified that state’s
election results without counting any votes at all from Essex County. See EDWARD FOLEY, BALLOT
BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35–40 (2016) (describing
in detail the issues involved in the New Jersey dispute).
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results.54 With that, the House retroactively validated the seating of the four
members of the New Jersey delegation, including two who had been present at
organization on April 1.55 As in Smith’s qualifications case, nobody questioned
these members’ entitlement to their seats during the pendency of the
investigation. They had appeared with valid credentials, however questionable
the vote tallies underlying those credentials may have been. They participated
in the business of the House, including both the debate on their own case,56 and
the vote on William Smith’s qualifications case.57
The First Congress thus prescribed, through precedent and statute, a clear
order of operations for the organization of the House. Those who show up with
facially valid credentials choose a Speaker. Then they take the oath. Only after
that, with the House properly constituted, does the House “enter[] on any other
business” such as challenges to members’ elections or qualifications.58 This is
the core of the Oaths First process.
ii. Other Early Precedents (1791–1831)
Every Congress from the Second (1791) through the Twenty-Second
(1831) followed the same simple order of operations: the Clerk called the roll,
the representatives-elect chose a Speaker, and the Speaker (sometimes after
making a short speech) swore in the representatives-elect.59 People with valid
credentials were seated and only after organization did the House consider
challenges to their elections or qualifications. In addition, until the practice fell
into disuse, the Committee of Elections later examined everyone’s credentials
and reported on them.60

54. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 835 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Currie, supra note 42, at 175–
76.
55. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 96, 835 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Currie, supra note 42, at
175–76.
56. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 638–39 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (showing
participation of Rep. Boudinot).
57. See id. at 408 (showing affirmative votes to seat Smith by all four New Jersey representatives
(Boudinot, Cadwalader, Sinnickson, and Schureman)); id. at 406–07 (showing participation in the
debate on Smith by Rep. Boudinot).
58. See 2 U.S.C. § 25.
59. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 141–42 (1791); 4 id. at 133–34 (1793); 5 id. at 125–26 (1795); 7
id. at 49–51 (1797); 10 id. at 185–87 (1799); 11 id. at 309–10 (1801); 13 id. at 369–70 (1803); 15 id.
at 253–54 (1805); 17 id. at 781–83 (1807); 20 id. at 53–56 (1809); 23 id. at 329–31 (1811); 26 id. at
105–07 (1813); 29 id. at 373–75 (1815); 31 id. at 397–99 (1817); 35 id. at 701–03 (1819); 38 id. at
513–17 (1821) (requiring 2 days and 12 ballots to choose a Speaker); 41 id. at 793–96 (1823); 2 REG.
DEB. 795–96 (1825); 4 id. at 811–12 (1827); 6 id. at 470–71 (1829).
60. See 1 HINDS, supra note 14, §§ 16–18, at 12 (1907) (describing the practice and its cessation
around 1839).
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These years saw numerous challenges—some successful—to members’
elections61 and qualifications,62 but never before the oath was administered.
This respect for the Oaths First precedent was especially significant given that
most states held their House elections more than a year before the winners
convened in Congress.63 As such, the basis for any serious challenges would
have been well known before the House convened.64
iii. Cracks Appear (1833–1837)
While the Oaths First precedent had a strong foundation, it had an inherent
limit. Everyone with valid credentials takes the oath, but which credentials are
valid? And who decides? An 1833 dispute raised this very issue, and eroded
the clarity with which the Oaths First precedent had been observed in the
previous four decades.
At the opening of the Twenty-Third Congress, Thomas Moore appeared on
the roll for Kentucky’s Fifth District, on the basis of a certificate transmitted by

61. See generally CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47. One example sheds light on the House’s
order of operations. In 1793, two days after organization, the House received a petition from Henry
Latimer challenging the election of John Patten (spelled in the record as “Patton”) as Delaware’s
representative. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 135 (1793); see also id. at 140–41 (reporting the petition’s
referral to the Committee of Elections). Patten had not yet appeared. See id. at 133–35. On December
6, the Committee of Elections reported on everyone’s credentials and, in the process, noted the petition
against Patten. See id. at 138. But when Patten appeared a week later and produced his credentials,
he was seated without any reported incident or delay, notwithstanding the preexisting petition against
him. See id. at 142. The petition against him had merit—on February 13 the whole House agreed,
voting to oust Patten and seat Latimer. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 70–72. It was regarded
as entirely proper, though, that Patten had been seated and had served in the meantime.
62. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47 (chronicling sixty-one House elections and
qualifications cases up to 1834); EXCLUSION CASES, supra note 52 (chronicling thirty House
qualifications cases before 1973). There were also incompatibility cases, though these too were dealt
with only after the House was organized. See, e.g., CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 122–27, 284–
314.
63. See Brian C. Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks: Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, 54
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 113–14 (2017) (explaining the original timeline); cf. U.S. CONST. amend.
XX, §§ 1–2 (changing this lengthy wait to the current, brief lame-duck period). At this point, states
did not have a common day for House elections, though most voted in the summer or fall of evennumbered years. See MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788–1997:
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS (1998) (listing dates of House elections by state); 1 HINDS, supra note 14,
§ 678, at 874 (discussing time limits for contesting elections).
64. One reason to use this process was that the Committee of Elections played an important role
in resolving these challenges. See Jeffery A. Jenkins, Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in
the House of Representatives, 1789–2002, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 113, 113–15 (2004) (describing
the contested-election process in the antebellum House). See generally CLARKE & HALL, supra note
47. Committees could only be appointed after the House was organized, so it seemed pointless to
initiate challenges before that.
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Kentucky’s governor.65 Before the Speaker election, an objector argued that
the certificate was invalid, because it lacked two signatures required by state
law.66 The election result was in dispute as well, and the other candidate, Robert
Letcher, had also appeared to claim the seat.67
Moore objected to the dispute being considered before organization. First,
he said, the members-elect had to take their oaths on the basis of their prima
facie rights to their seats.68 But that begged the question of whether Moore had
that prima facie right.69
Moore and Letcher resolved the impasse by both voluntarily withdrawing.70
The other members-elect then proceeded to choose a Speaker and take their
oaths.71 After several months of committee work, the House declared
Kentucky’s Fifth District vacant and ordered a new election, which Letcher
won.72
Moore’s case did not alter the Oaths First precedent so much as expose its
outer bound: Moore’s credentials had an obvious, fundamental defect.73 The
real lesson was that the Clerk should have been more careful before adding
Moore to the roll—something that, later on, legislation would require the Clerk
to do.74

65. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 717–18.
66. See id. at 719–20.
67. See 10 REG. DEB. 2130–31 (1833); CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 716, 721.
68. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 718.
69. See id. at 719–20 (statement of Rep. Allan) (“[H]e admitted that if that paper, according to
the laws of Kentucky, had been certified and signed by the persons required to certify and sign it, then,
by the usages of that House, the gentleman was entitled for the present to be recognised as the sitting
member. But if the paper was not . . . then it was a nullity . . . .”).
70. See 10 REG. DEB. 2135 (1833) (“Mr. LETCHER then proposed to Mr. MOORE, that they
should both withdraw until after the election for Speaker had taken place. Mr. MOORE was understood
as acquiescing in this proposal[.]”); id. at 2137 (noting that when the oath was administered to
members, “when Mr. MOORE was called, it appeared that he and Mr. LETCHER had concurred in
allowing the organization of the House to be completed before the question between them was again
raised, and neither of them was sworn.”); CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 721. The House Journal
reported more vaguely that “by general consent, it was agreed that Mr. Moore should not be called.”
H.R. JOURNAL, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1833).
71. See 10 REG. DEB. 2136–37 (1833).
72. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–2005, H.R. DOC.
108-222, at 108 n.24 (2005) [hereinafter DIRECTORY]; CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 747–850.
73. See CLARKE & HALL, supra note 47, at 742–43 (comments of Rep. Huntington) (noting that
“[i]n all the cases which had heretofore come before the House, this subject had not been touched
upon,” because “[t]he objections had arisen subsequently”).
74. See infra text accompanying note 139.
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Significantly, that same year of 1833 marked the genesis of the Whig
Party.75 Since the demise of the Federalist Party in 1815, partisan politics had
been muted. Now, however, interparty rifts and struggles would reemerge with
a vengeance. While the Oaths First precedent itself remained relatively safe for
nearly three more decades, the era of simple, orderly House organizations was
over.
The next Congress in 1835 opened with dissension over procedures for the
Speaker election.76 In 1837, organization featured a constitutional controversy
about two representatives elected only to serve in a special session.77
Democratic Representative-Elect Francis Thomas called for adherence to the
Oaths First precedent: “If this unvaried custom is now departed from, our
difficulties will be interminable.”78 Oaths First prevailed in 1837,79 but
Thomas’s warning would soon prove prophetic.

75. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY 20–28 (1999).
76. Before the Speaker election, there was an unprecedented interruption—a motion, debate, and
voting—regarding whether the Speaker election should continue to be by secret ballot. See 12 REG.
DEB. 1943–45 (1835). Secret balloting won out for the time being, but two Congresses later it was
replaced by voting viva voce, a move that reflected the new drive toward party discipline. See JEFFERY
A. JENKINS & CHARLES STEWART III, FIGHTING FOR THE SPEAKERSHIP: THE HOUSE AND THE RISE
OF PARTY GOVERNMENT 14–15, 102–08 (2013).
77. The new House had convened three months early because President Van Buren had called a
special session. See 14 REG. DEB. 558 (1837). Mississippi held its House elections in November of
odd-numbered years, a month before Congress convened, instead of the more common practice of
voting many more months before. See D.W. BARTLETT, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN
CONGRESS, FROM 1834 TO 1865 INCLUSIVE, H.R. MISC. DOC. 38-57, at 9–13 (1865). Because there
would have been nobody to represent Mississippi at the special session, the governor called a special
election to fill the seats in the special session, while the regularly scheduled election would fill the
seats for the remainder of the term. See id. at 11. The objectors argued that the governor had no
authority to break the term in two by calling a separate election for only the first part of the term, and
fought not to seat Gholson and Claiborne, the two Mississippi representatives-elect in question. See
14 REG. DEB. 559–60 (1837). The fight turned on the same chicken-and-egg questions as this Article’s
elections, returns, and qualifications disputes. The representatives-elect being challenged said that
they had just as much right to be there as anyone else with state credentials. See 14 REG. DEB. 560
(1837). An opponent said, “Let those, of whose right there was no reasonable doubt, pass on the claims
of those whose right was doubtful.” Id. at 562–63. This drew the obvious rejoinder, “[W]ho was to
decide whether there was reasonable doubt in any case or not?” Id. at 563.
78. See 14 REG. DEB. 564 (1837).
79. The debate petered out without a vote, the Speaker was chosen, and Gholson and Claiborne
were seated along with everyone else. See id. at 565–66; CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1837).
The House debated the case further after organization and voted in October to affirm Gholson and
Claiborne’s seating. See BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 13. However, after the regular session began
the House voted to rescind that determination and declare Mississippi’s seats vacant. See id. at 15–16.
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iv. The New Jersey Debacle (1839)
The Twenty-Sixth Congress featured the “Broad Seal War,” perhaps the
messiest organization in the House’s history. Several representatives-elect with
valid credentials were barred before the Speaker election and oath, thereby
flipping partisan control of the House.80 This first and most serious breach of
the Oaths First process clearly revealed how valuable the precedent was—and
how costly it could be to turn away from it.
In its 1838 congressional elections, New Jersey elected its six
representatives at-large instead of by district.81 One Whig representative won
by a decisive margin.82 According to the official results certified by the Whig
governor, five other Whig representatives won too, but narrowly.83 Democrats
protested that the votes from two towns had been excluded, and that more
complete totals showed the five Whigs had actually lost to five Democrats.84
The New Jersey secretary of state (in opposition to the governor but with no
real authority) issued the Democratic candidates a set of self-styled certificates
of election.85
When the new House convened on December 2, 1839, both quintets of
would-be New Jersey representatives were there. Under the Oaths First
precedent, the Whigs should have been seated under their prima facie right, as
they had the lawful returns (the certificate from the governor with the state’s
so-called broad seal on it). The challenge to their election should have waited
until after organization.86
But the House Clerk, Hugh Garland, had other ideas. Garland had been
selected by the previous, lame-duck, Democratic-controlled House with full
knowledge that the New Jersey dispute would fall into his lap.87 At
organization, bucking prior practice, Garland did not add the New Jersey Whigs
80. See generally JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 110–24; cf. CHESTER H. ROWELL,
DIGEST OF ALL THE CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789–1901, at 109 (1901) (“The
importance of this case is not derived from any particular novelty or importance in its issues, but simply
from the fact that the political control of the House turned on its determination, and that on this account
it received a more elaborate discussion, both in the committee and in the House, than has ever been
given to any other case.”).
81. See Ronald Becker, Broad Seal War, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW JERSEY 101, 101 (Maxine
N. Lurie & Marc Mappen eds., 2004).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 19; CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1839).
86. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 114.
87. See id. at 111–13. The Clerk was selected after the death of the previous Clerk, and after the
New Jersey election. See id.
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to the roll—instead he asked “the House” whether, given the disputed election,
it was its pleasure that he pass over the five seats, deferring any decision on
them until after the other members had been sworn in.88
A lengthy and contentious debate ensued.89 The Whigs stood on precedent
and principle: the New Jersey governor’s certificate provided the same prima
facie evidence as every other representative-elect’s.90 Further, the Whigs said,
any disputes should wait until after the Speaker was elected and the House was
organized; until then no one assembled had any more right to challenge a
colleague than that colleague had to challenge them, and the Clerk was inviting
tit-for-tat challenges and chaos.91
The Democrats retorted that the governor’s decision was so obviously
incorrect that it should not be respected, and that the other representatives-elect
should not allow such blatant fraud to poison the organization of the House.92
They said that it was either incumbent upon the Clerk, inherent in the authority
of the assembled representatives-elect, or both, to promptly scrutinize the New
Jersey governor’s decision on the merits.93
This party lineup reversed the one in the previous Congress’s organizational
debate, lest anyone think that either side had been motivated by high-minded
principles.94 The Whigs were right in 1839, but that was a coincidence, just
like it was when they were wrong in 1837. The only principle on display was
the pursuit of partisan advantage.
Part of the debate concerned the Clerk’s proper role.95 But the immediate
question was, now that the Clerk had made his choice, what could the
88. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1839).
89. See id. at 1–52.
90. Among many others, see id. at 2 (comments of Reps.-Elect Halstead, Hoffman, and
Tillinghast).
91. Among many others, see id. at 2 (comments of Rep.-Elect Halstead and Tillinghast); id. at
11 (comments of Rep.-Elect Waddy Thompson).
92. Among many others, see id. at 8–9 (comments of Rep.-Elect Vanderpoel); id. at 10
(comments of Rep.-Elect Weller); id. at 13 (comments of Rep.-Elect Craig).
93. Among many others, see id. at 8 (comments of Rep.-Elect Vanderpoel); id. at 10 (comments
of Rep.-Elect Weller); id. at 13 (comments of Rep.-Elect Pickens).
94. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text; cf. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1839) (comments of Rep.-Elect Vanderpoel) (quoting an argument made in the previous Congress’s
consideration of Claiborne and Gholson by a member of the other party); id. at 26 (comments of Rep.Elect White) (doing the same with previous arguments by Vanderpoel and others and asking
sarcastically, “What has brought so radical a change in the gentleman’s political creed?”).
95. But see CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1839) (comments of Rep.-Elect Wise)
(noting that even if the Clerk had not acted in this way, someone would have stepped forward and
effected the same result of stopping the roll); id. at 30 (comments of Rep.-Elect Duncan) (claiming to
have objected at the time the Clerk got to the New Jersey portion of the roll). Eventually, the unsworn
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assembled members-elect do about it? Would they use the same rule of
necessity that had allowed members-elect to organize the first House in 1789?
If so, which set of five New Jerseyans would vote: the Whigs, the Democrats,
neither, or both? Complicating matters, there was also a disputed election from
Pennsylvania concerning Representative-Elect Charles Naylor.96
The Speakership and partisan control of the closely divided House hung in
the balance. This was precisely the situation in which pre-commitment to
precedent would have been helpful. But the stakes were too high; the Oaths
First precedent was disregarded.
The debate quickly became mired in a tedious series of procedural
questions. On December 11, for instance, there was a meta-vote on who should
have been allowed to vote on a motion to table a motion about who should be
able to vote.97 The motion to table had failed 115–115, but one of the “No”
votes had come from Charles Naylor.98 A challenge to Naylor’s right to vote
seemingly passed, 118–112, but the already raucous proceedings degenerated
further.99 Another vote on Naylor contradicted the first and Naylor ended up
participating, albeit on the losing side, in a 115–118 vote on whether to add the
five New Jersey Whigs to the roll.100 One more attempt to seat the Whig
contenders failed 117–117 because of two Whigs who went missing.101
Ten days in, after powering through a thicket of dilatory motions, the
assemblage finally began voting on the Speaker; none of the ten New Jersey
disputants participated.102 Three days and eleven ballots later, the House chose
R.M.T. Hunter, a Whig with Democratic leanings, as a compromise Speaker.103
The next day, after more wrangling, the oath was administered to everyone—
except any of the disputed New Jerseyans.104 Months after that, on March 16,
1840, the five Whig candidates were seated provisionally.105 Then, on July

members chose Whig Representative-Elect (and former President) John Quincy Adams to preside over
the mess instead of the Clerk. See id. at 20.
96. See id. at 27.
97. See id. at 38–41.
98. See id. at 38.
99. See id. at 39 (depicting the colorful “[g]reat disorder . . . prevailing in the House”).
100. See id. at 40–41.
101. See id. at 48; JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 115–16.
102. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 48–52 (1839). For a more complete account of
these very complex and confusing proceedings, see 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 103, at 68–74.
103. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 118–26.
104. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1839). Naylor of Pennsylvania slipped in, but
because he had been the subject of voting before the oath this was not consistent with the Oaths First
precedent.
105. See id. at 275; BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 22.

KALT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SWEARING IN THE PHOENIX

19

16—just five days before the session ended—the House decided that the
Democrats were entitled to the seats.106
For this Article’s purposes, the Broad Seal War is important for three
reasons. First, the Oaths First precedent had been violated. For the first time,
members-elect with valid credentials had been prevented from taking their
oaths—and prevented by objectors who had not yet taken the oath and whose
credentials were no more official. Second, the episode showed what a big mess
pre-organization challenges can produce, especially when the House’s party
balance is close to even. Third and finally, even as it trashed the Oaths First
precedent, the Broad Seal War produced a different helpful principle. In the
midst of this messy process, Representative Naylor had voted on the New
Jersey dispute (albeit based on a confusing and very narrow vote). This
notion—that challenged members-elect should be able to vote on challenges to
other members-elect—is central to this Article.107
v. The Quiet Aftermath (1841–1859)
Perhaps out of recognition of the damage the Broad Seal War had done, it
was decades before the Oaths First precedent was again disrespected. Notably,
this was so even though the House was closely divided on several occasions.
At the next two Congresses, House organization was interrupted only
briefly by objections that were deferred for later consideration.108 Most of the
next several Houses proceeded directly from the roll to the Speaker election to
the oath without any interruptions.109
Three organizations had contentious Speaker elections, but none of them
featured pre-oath disputes over anyone’s elections or qualifications. In 1849,
106. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 533 (1839); BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 19–33;
JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC
NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 175 (2007).
107. See infra Section IV.E.
108. In 1841, someone made an inquiry about a disputed election, but the Clerk produced the
governor’s certificate under which one of the two contenders would be seated, at which point the group
proceeded with the Speaker election and oath. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1841). The
dispute was later resolved in favor of the challenger. See DIRECTORY, supra note 72, at 126 nn.67–
68. In 1843, someone attempted to get the unorganized House to decide whether certain delegations—
elected at large in contravention of a recently passed federal law requiring district-based
representation—should be seated. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1843) (comments of
Rep.-Elect Campbell of South Carolina). The attempt failed; the Speaker election and oath proceeded
apace, and the challenge was addressed (and rejected) only later. See id. at 3–4; BARTLETT, supra note
77, at 47–69.
109. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 1–2 (1845); id., 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1–3 (1847);
id., 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 5–10 (1851) (showing delay because of colloquy about partisan matters, but
no motions or other official action); id., 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1–2 (1853); id., 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1–
2 (1857).
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with the House riven by the slavery issue and the emergence of the Free Soil
Party, it took three disorderly weeks and sixty-three ballots to elect a Speaker.110
During that time, there were plenty of heated disagreements but no challenges
to anyone’s right to participate.111 The 1855 Speaker election surpassed that,
taking two months and a whopping 133 ballots to elect a Speaker.112 There too,
no one’s seating was challenged until after the Speaker election and
administration of the oath, despite the existence of several close or disputed
elections.113 Finally, in 1859, the presence of third parties and splinter factions,
coupled with high tensions over slavery, contributed to a fiercely fought series
of forty-four ballots over two months before a Speaker was chosen.114 Yet
again, multiple representatives’ elections were challenged—two of them
successfully—but only after the Speaker election and the oath.115

110. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 156–67; CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1849) (describing one particularly raucous vignette).
111. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 2–67 (1849). There were several close races. See
DUBIN, supra note 63, at 154–55 (listing multiple races decided by sub-1% margins, including
Connecticut’s First District (0.8%), Kentucky’s Seventh District (0.5%), Maryland’s Second District
(0.8%), North Carolina’s Eighth District (0.5%), Rhode Island’s Western District (0.5%; twenty votes),
and Tennessee’s Eighth District (0.8%)). Two members were challenged later in the session, one
successfully. See BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 118–41; DUBIN, supra note 63, at 157 n.2. A race
being decided by less than 1% is a very rough proxy for contestability; most sub-1% results were not
overturned, and many races that were overturned featured initial margins above 1%.
112. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 177–88.
113. Illinois’s Seventh District election was decided by a single vote and after being contested
was declared vacant. See CONG GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 427 (1855) (lodging protest only after
the Speaker election); BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 169–76; DUBIN, supra note 63, at 169, 175. Other
elections decided by less than 1% included: Georgia’s Fourth District (0.5%); Iowa’s First District
(0.7%); Kentucky’s Fourth District (0.1%); Maryland’s Third District (0.4%); New York’s Fourth
District (0.2% between members of two Democratic factions); Pennsylvania’s Fifth District (0.05%;
eight votes); and Texas’s First District (0.2%). See id. at 170–73. Another member was challenged
later in the session. BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 176–77. Also noteworthy is an objection raised to
the seating of the delegate from the Territory of Kansas—the objector noted his objection but restrained
himself from pressing it before the oath was administered, in deference to the Oaths First process. See
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1856) (comments of Rep.-Elect Grow).
114. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 212–23.
115. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 655 (1860) (recounting resolution of the Speaker
election deadlock and administration of the oath); BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 275–341; DUBIN, supra
note 63, at 186 nn.4–5 (describing successful Howard and Blair contests). There were several elections
with sub-1% margins: Connecticut’s First District (0.3%); Kentucky’s Fourth (0.02%; three votes) and
Eighth (0.5%) Districts; Maine’s Third District (0.4%); Maryland’s Fifth District (0.8%); Michigan’s
First District (0.3%); New York’s Ninth (0.08%; thirteen votes) and Eleventh (0.6%) Districts; Ohio’s
Third (0.96%), Fourth (0.4%), Ninth (0.6%), and Seventeenth (0.6%) Districts; Oregon’s at-large
district (0.2%; sixteen votes); Pennsylvania’s Eighth (0.1%; nineteen votes) and Sixteenth (0.3%)
Districts; Tennessee’s First (0.4%) and Ninth (0.04%; seven votes) Districts; and Virginia’s Third
District (0.9%). Id. at 182–83, 185.
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In sum, one could say that the Oaths First precedent remained strong
throughout the seven decades between the Founding and the Civil War, even
during difficult times. The sole exception, 1839’s Broad Seal War, served as a
cautionary example.
B. Things Fall Apart (1861–1897)
House organization processes changed in 1861—along with many other
things in the United States. In short order, the Oaths First process would be
supplanted by the Step Aside process. This shift was not carefully considered,
and it served no positive purpose, but it stuck.
i. The Beginning of the End (1861–1867)
When the Thirty-Seventh Congress convened for a special session on July
4, 1861, eleven states had already seceded.116 This avoided the partisan divides
that had troubled so many recent Congresses; the Republican Party was firmly
in control. But the 1861 organization would prove to be a muddle—and the
beginning of the end of the Oaths First era.
During the call of the roll, Representative-Elect Thaddeus Stevens, a
prominent Republican leader, made an announcement. After the Speaker
election, Stevens said, he would object to his fellow Pennsylvanian, Democratic
Representative-Elect William Lehman, taking the oath instead of J.M. Butler,
who Stevens claimed was the properly credentialed representative-elect from
the district.117 Following his lead, several other representatives-elect
announced their intentions to object later: to Representative-Elect Charles
Upton, based on residency; to the entire Virginia delegation, based on
Virginia’s secessionist authorities having purported to cancel the election; to
Representative-Elect A.J. Thayer, based on Oregon having held conflicting
elections, with Thayer’s allegedly being invalid; and to three representativeselect who were military officers, based on the Incompatibility Clause.118

116. The roll listed two members from the eleven seceded states. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1861). Both were from Virginia—unionists from what later became West Virginia. See
DIRECTORY, supra note 72, at 93 n.21.
117. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1861). Stevens spoke up when he did, he said,
to avoid being estopped from raising his challenge later. See id. at 3. It is unclear why Stevens thought
he had to act when Lehman was first called on the roll. There was no precedent for anything of the
sort in previous practice, and Stevens had been serving in the House since 1849. See Stevens,
Thaddeus, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/S/STEVENS,-Thaddeus-(S000887)/
[https://perma.cc/Y5G4-2G63].
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (Incompatibility Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1861); see also id. at 5–7 (providing more detail regarding Virginia).
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Then, immediately after the Speaker election,119 Stevens made a successful
motion that only “those whose seats are uncontested be first sworn in.”120 By
“contested” Stevens meant seats claimed by multiple people,121 which would
have excluded only Lehman and Thayer from taking the oath, not Upton or the
others. Nevertheless, Upton and his objector began a back-and-forth about
Upton’s residency dispute.122 This dawdling prompted an exchange that
encapsulates the entire issue of this Article:
Mr. CURTIS. I rise to a question of order. I submit that
[Stevens’s attempt to force Lehman and Thayer aside is] out of
order. The House is still in an unorganized condition. It is our
first business to perfect our organization; and I claim,
therefore, until that shall have been done, these resolutions and
motions, the effect of which must necessarily be to delay our
organization, are not in order.
The SPEAKER. The Chair overrules the question of order.123
Curtis was right that following the Oaths First precedent and leaving
challenges until after everyone had sworn in—as the House had done for three
generations at that point—would have been more expeditious. Contrary to
Stevens’s sense of urgency in making his objections early, the Oaths First
process had always proven perfectly capable of leaving these matters until later.
Stevens had not given any reason for his departure from past practice.
But Curtis was wrong to suggest that this precedent had some binding effect
that required members-elect to refrain from speaking, making motions, and
voting on those motions.124 Members-elect can do those things. The point of
the Oaths First process was only ever that members-elect should not use their
pre-oath powers to argue about membership. In other words, the Oaths First
precedent was only as strong as House members’ continued desire to uphold it,
and that desire faltered in 1861.
If Stevens was unwilling to save all of the membership hubbub until after
the oath, he at least wanted to save most of it for then. But despite his intention
to force only Lehman and Thayer to step aside, another objector had different
119. All of the challenged members-elect besides Thayer and Brown (one of the challenged
Virginians) participated in the Speaker election. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1861).
120. See id. at 5.
121. See id. (comments of Rep.-Elect Colfax) (reflecting this interpretation). Congress had
passed laws, including one in 1851 that was in force at the time, to govern procedures for losing
candidates to contest elections, so it was likely understood that “contested” referred to such cases. See
generally Henry L. Dawes, The Mode of Procedure in Cases of Contested Elections, 2 J. SOC. SCI. 56
(1869).
122. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1861).
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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plans. In that era, the Speaker administered the oath to one state delegation at
a time.125 When it was the Virginia delegation’s turn to swear in,
Representative Henry Burnett stepped forward to renew his objection to them,
and moved that the question of the Virginians’ right to swear in be referred to
the Committee of Elections.126
Stevens protested that it was out of order to interrupt the swearing-in in this
way, but Burnett noted that the Constitution gave the House the power to judge
its membership, and that “[n]o time is prescribed at which the question shall be
raised.”127 Burnett was right, but again the issue was not whether the protoHouse could deal with these questions at that time. Rather, it was whether the
House should do so. After some debate about the secession situation in
Virginia, Burnett’s motion was tabled.128
Next, after everyone else had taken their oaths, the Speaker made sure that
Lehman and Thayer’s cases were considered before the House did anything
else.129 After significant debate, both men were sworn in pending further
investigation of their cases (Thayer would later be unseated).130
At first glance, it might appear that the Oaths First precedent had not been
breached. Only Lehman and Thayer had been forced to step aside, and both of
their cases purportedly entailed a challenge to their credentials.131 As seen in
1833, the Oaths First process only guarantees that those with valid credentials
be seated before they face objections to their membership; those who lack valid
credentials are fair game.132 But while Thayer’s case involved dueling
credentials,133 Lehman’s did not. Pennsylvania’s governor had, in fact, certified
Lehman as the winner of his election on the same document on which he

125. The practice of having the Speaker swear members in by state rather than en masse had
begun in 1809 and 1813. See 20 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1809); 26 id. at 107 (1813). The practice
ended in 1929. See infra text accompanying note 312.
126. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1861).
127. Id. at 5–6. Stevens conceded that if Burnett had been arguing that the Virginia memberselect lacked credentials, it would have been acceptable for him to object at that time. See id.
Notwithstanding that concession, a later inquiry about their credentials was ruled out of order. See id.
at 6.
128. See id.
129. See id. Consideration of a dispute regarding a territorial delegate was deferred until much
later. See id. at 13; BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 402–14.
130. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 6–10 (1861); BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 349–
66.
131. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1861) (comments of Reps.-Elect Stevens and
McClernand).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 65–74.
133. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 9–10 (1861).
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certified the rest of the Pennsylvania delegation (including Stevens himself).134
Stevens’s objection was rooted in a dispute over alleged deceit in the underlying
count; in certifying Lehman as the winner, the governor had overruled a lowerlevel bureaucratic determination as fraudulent.135 But there was no argument
that the credentials themselves—the paperwork—were out of order.
Even if Lehman’s case had been about credentials, though, Stevens had
blazed a new trail. Things had not moved fully to the Step Aside process;
Lehman and Thayer were forced aside by a vote of the unsworn assemblage,
not merely by one member-elect’s objection.136 But this was unlike 1833,
where the disputants had stepped aside voluntarily.137 Moreover, Stevens had
not said that he was forcing people aside only because their credentials were in
question. To him, the key was that they were the subject of a contest, with
someone else present and claiming their seat—something that could be true of
any run-of-the-mill election dispute.138
In March 1863, just before the end of the term, Congress enacted legislation
to formalize the Clerk’s role in the House’s organization. The new law required
the Clerk of the old House to act before organization to make a roll of the
representatives-elect, placing on it only those people “whose credentials show
that they were regularly elected in accordance with the laws of their states
respectively, or the laws of the United States.”139 This is what most Clerks had
been doing all along, but the new law formalized both the Clerk’s role and the
legal standard.
The new law had a strategic purpose. Republicans had done poorly in the
1862 elections, and their control of the new House was tenuous.140 Republicans
wanted to empower the Clerk, Emerson Etheridge, to limit “bogus members”
sent from the South who would weaken Republican control.141 At the same

134. See id. at 7.
135. See id. at 3, 5, 7–9.
136. See id. at 5. There was not a roll-call vote, so it is unclear who voted, and in particular
whether Lehman and Thayer voted. See id.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 65–74.
138. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1861) (comments of Rep.-Elect Stevens) (“I
make the motion that those whose seats are uncontested be first sworn in.”).
139. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 108, 12 Stat. 804.
140. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 245 (noting that Republicans would need the
support of non-Republican Unionists to control the House).
141. Herman Belz, The Etheridge Conspiracy of 1863: A Projected Conservative Coup, 36 J.S.
HIST. 549, 553 (1970); see JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 245–46; HALBERT PAINE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ELECTIONS 603 (1888) (describing the new statute’s purpose as avoiding a
“real and substantial danger that mere intruders might, by means of fictitious or forged
credentials . . . participate in the organization of the house”).
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time, the law allowed the Clerk to enroll members elected in the Unionoccupied (i.e., liberal, Republican-friendly) parts of the South.142
But Etheridge had come to oppose the Republican administration in the
wake of its embrace of abolitionism.143 With Democratic Representative
Samuel Cox, Etheridge hatched a plan to scrutinize credentials hyper-strictly
for the December 1863 organization, and to tip off only the Democrats in
advance.144 When the new House convened, Etheridge had kept sixteen liberal
Republicans off the roll and added three conservative Republicans from Unionoccupied Louisiana.145
The Republican members-elect got wind of the plot and were ready: they
moved to add the first group of their omitted colleagues (those from Maryland)
to the roll.146 Despite their depleted numbers—none of the omitted members
from other states were able to vote—the Republicans’ motion passed; they had
needed a total of two Democrats or Unionists to vote with them and they got
eleven.147 Triumphant, they proceeded to add the other omitted Republicans to
the roll, and then to elect their preferred candidate for Speaker.148
Had the Democrats and Unionists stuck together and adhered to Etheridge’s
scheme, they could have controlled the majority and chosen the Speaker. It is
doubtful that the Republicans would have taken this lying down, though—they
had made contingency plans to choose a temporary Speaker and delay
organization until the omitted Republicans could return with satisfactory
credentials, or even to remove the Clerk by force if necessary.149 Luckily for
everyone concerned, it did not come to that.150
As the entire struggle concerned the validity of credentials, none of this
implicated the Oaths First precedent as such. Everyone with clearly valid
credentials was able to be sworn in at the outset. There was debate and voting
before the oath, but only about whose credentials were valid, not about elections
142. See Belz, supra note 141, at 553.
143. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 245; Belz, supra note 141, at 555–56.
144. See JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 245–46; Belz, supra note 141, at 556–57.
145. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 4–6 (1863); JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76,
at 246; Belz, supra note 141, at 561–62.
146. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 4–5 (1863); JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76,
at 246; Belz, supra note 141, at 558–59.
147. These numbers are not from the vote on the motion itself but on an unsuccessful motion to
table it, in which five Democrats and six Unionists joined with the Republicans in the 74–94 vote. See
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1863); JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 246–47; Belz,
supra note 141, at 562.
148. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 5–6 (1863); JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76,
at 247; Belz, supra note 141, at 562.
149. See Belz, supra note 141, at 560–61.
150. See id. at 566.
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or qualifications. The same was true later, when the three conservative
Louisianans’ questionable credentials were dealt with. By a party-line vote, the
proto-House prevented the Louisianans from taking the oath and referred their
case to the Committee of Elections.151 The three were never seated.152
Still, the notion that members-elect should sit by passively until after the
Speaker is chosen and everyone’s oaths are administered had faded further. The
Republican majority was willing to use its power to exercise closer control over
the House’s membership.153 Soon, objections and debate during organization
would be further normalized, and the Oaths First precedent would be
thoroughly dismantled.
When the House next convened, in December 1865, the Civil War was over.
None of the Confederate states had been readmitted and none of the people
purportedly elected from them were seated.154 A would-be member from
Tennessee protested that he and his compatriots should be added to the roll,155
but the Clerk ruled him out of order and nothing came of the protest.156
Addressing the 1865 Tennessee protest, and the Louisiana dispute from
1863, Congress amended the law on the roll of representatives-elect.157 The
new law limited the Clerk to enrolling only those representatives-elect “from
States which were represented in the next preceding Congress.”158 This ensured
that readmission would be effected by the House during the term, and not by a
Clerk (conniving or otherwise) at organization.159 Despite the solid hold on
151. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 7–8 (1863). Representative-Elect Thaddeus
Stevens withdrew an initial attempt to strike the Louisianans from the roll, and two of the three voted
in the Speaker election. See id. at 5–7. But when it came time to administer the oath—after every
other state’s delegation had sworn in—Stevens renewed his objection. See id. at 7 (comments of Rep.Elect Stevens). He argued that there was no legitimate state government in Louisiana to issue
credentials, and that the conservatives’ credentials were signed by “a man whom nobody in the United
States ever heard of as Governor, and with his private seal attached.” Id. at 7 (comments of Rep.-Elect
Stevens).
152. See Frederick W. Moore, Representation in the National Congress from the Seceding
States, 1861–65, 2 AM. HIST. REV. 461, 471 (1897).
153. Cf. Comment, Legislative Exclusion: Julian Bond and Adam Clayton Powell, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 157 (1967) (noting Radical Republicans’ greater willingness after the Civil War to exclude
“duly elected representative[s],” a change “brought about by the naked urgency of power” and that had
“little doctrinal support”).
154. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3–5 (1865).
155. See id. at 3 (comments of Mr. Maynard); DUBIN, supra note 63, at 201, 203 n.13.
156. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3–5 (1865).
157. See Act of Feb. 21, 1867, ch. 56, § 1, 14 Stat. 397.
158. Id.
159. The Clerk’s actions in 1865 in not recognizing southerners had set a crucial precedent
against their states’ readmission—one for which the Clerk was handsomely rewarded with a “prime
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Congress the Radical Republicans won in 1866, they were cautious in the wake
of the Etheridge episode about ever again giving a Clerk that much
discretionary power again.160
The Fortieth Congress opened in March 1867 with what would prove to be
the last gasp of the Oaths First era.161 There were many challenges to people’s
qualifications or elections, but none were made before the oath.162
ii. The End (1869)
The Oaths First process was repudiated definitively in the House’s 1869
organization. Pre-oath objections abounded, and while their subjects retreated
voluntarily rather than being forced not to take the oath, the stage was set for
the birth of the current, inferior Step Aside precedent.
Things got raucous before the Speaker election,163 but eventually order was
restored and the large Republican majority voted James Blaine in as Speaker.164
As Blaine swore in the state delegations one by one, several members-elect
were met with objections.165 One major issue was Section 3 of the recently
ratified Fourteenth Amendment, which barred from federal office anyone who,
as an officeholder, had supported the Confederacy.166 Unfortunately, Section 3

patronage tool.” JENKINS & STEWART, supra note 76, at 252 & n.18. The new law did not rely on the
Clerk, and so was a safer way for the Republicans to proceed.
160. See Belz, supra note 141, at 567.
161. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1867); Act of Jan. 22, 1867, ch. 10, 14 Stat.
378.
162. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 2–4 (1867). Election challenges began to be
lodged soon after the oath. See id. at 5. Numerous cases arose later, when elected members with
questionable loyalty arrived to be sworn in, but the House was already organized at this point. See
EXCLUSION CASES, supra note 52, at 10–11 (members sworn in without the matter being referred to
committee); id. at 16–18 (members not sworn initially, but sworn in after consideration by committee);
id. at 91–93 (members not sworn in initially, and rejected permanently after consideration by
committee).
163. At the outset, there was a dispute over Pennsylvania’s Twenty-First District. The governor
issued no credentials because of problems with the vote tallies, but he declared that, in his opinion,
Republican John Covode had been elected. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 2–3 (1869); 1
HINDS, supra note 14, § 559, at 719–20. George Woodward, a Pennsylvania Democrat, moved to add
the Democratic contender, Henry Foster, to the roll. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1869).
The assemblage avoided the issue by voting to proceed to the Speaker election. See id. Next, conflict
erupted when New York Democrat James Brooks complained that the Clerk had not enrolled anyone
from Georgia or Louisiana. See id. at 4. The Clerk ruled Brooks out of order and the assemblage
became disorderly. Id. At one point there were calls for Brooks to be arrested by the Sergeant-atArms, prompting Brooks to note that no Sergeant-at-Arms had been chosen yet. Id.
164. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 4–5 (1869).
165. See id. at 5–8.
166. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
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did not prescribe procedures for evaluating such cases, other than providing that
a two-thirds vote in both Houses could remove any such disability.167
The first formal motion regarding disloyalty was leveled against a member
of the Maryland delegation, Democrat Representative-Elect Patrick Hamill; the
motion sought to refer Hamill’s case to the Committee of Elections and to not
swear him in in the meantime.168 There were multiple problems with this,
though. The main one was that the motion concerned qualifications, not
credentials. As Representative-Elect Michael Kerr noted—following the Oaths
First precedent—Hamill should have been allowed to take the oath given that
his credentials were “prima facie evidence of title to his seat.”169
But Kerr’s attempt to revive the Oaths First process was buried in the
shuffle. Instead, the debate centered on the timing of the vote. Republican
Representative Henry Dawes insisted that it was inappropriate to take a vote in
the middle of a state-by-state swearing-in process.170 The people who had not
yet taken their oaths were, he said, unqualified to take official action.171 Only
eight states’ delegations had taken the oath at that point, and they were short of
a quorum.172 Dawes (among others) wanted Hamill to step aside until everyone
else had taken their oaths.173
Democratic Representative Fernando Wood protested that under Dawes’s
suggested approach, a single objection could prevent someone from being
sworn in—anyone could be kept out, including Dawes himself.174 Dawes
responded that an objection would need to be “made in good faith and upon
some reasonable evidence,” to which Wood gave the obvious reply: “Who is to
tell that?”175
Dawes seemed to think that having Hamill stand aside was the only
alternative to conducting an immediate vote of only those people who had
sworn in already.176 But Speaker Blaine negated this premise, noting that
“precedents” supported participation by unsworn members-elect—there was no

167. Id.
168. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1869).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 6.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 5–6.
173. See id. (comments of Rep. Dawes). Others advocating for the Step Aside process instead
of an immediate vote included Representative-Elect Farnsworth and Representative Butler. See id. at
5.
174. See id. at 6.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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reason that they could not join their seated colleagues in voting on the motion
against Hamill.177
Blaine’s point was not; Hamill had already agreed to step aside, effectively
giving Dawes what he had wanted.178 But the debate—voting immediately on
Hamill versus swearing in everyone but Hamill and then voting—overlooked a
third possibility: the Oaths First process. The motion against Hamill did not
need to be made before the oath. Everyone with valid credentials, including
Hamill, could have taken the oath, and the objection to Hamill could have been
initiated and disposed of right after that. Kerr and Wood had seemed to
understand this, but their stray comments did not draw any responses.179
Shortly after Hamill stepped aside, two allegedly disloyal Kentuckians
(Democrats Boyd Winchester and John Rice) and two Missourians whose
elections were disputed (Republicans Robert Van Horn and David Dyer) faced
similar motions.180 The fact that Van Horn and Dyer were facing only an
election dispute—and thus were not only credentialed but unquestionably
qualified for office, unlike their allegedly disloyal colleagues—was briefly
noted but made no difference.181 Regardless, all four withdrew voluntarily and
were not sworn in with their delegations.182
A final motion challenged both the citizenship and election of Arkansas
Representative-Elect A.A.C. Rogers, but the assembly—still a mixture of
sworn and unsworn—voted to table the motion and Rogers was sworn in
without having to step aside.183
Even though Hamill, Winchester, Rice, Van Horn, and Dyer stepped aside
voluntarily, this was the death knell for the Oaths First precedent. Objectors
had prevented multiple people with unquestioned credentials from taking the
oath at organization. All of these departures from the Oaths First process did
not go unnoticed.
In the Van Horn/Dyer discussion, Democratic
Representative-Elect Samuel Marshall cited the 1839 Broad Seal War as
precedent for what the House had done.184 But Marshall was objecting to the
practice; he used 1839 as a cautionary example. In particular, Marshall saw the

177. See id. Representative-Elect J. Proctor Knott objected to Blaine’s assertion, but Blaine was
correct that “precedents” supported this notion. Id.; see supra note 15; supra text accompanying note
124.
178. See CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1869).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 169, 174–75.
180. See CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 6–7 (1869).
181. See id. at 7 (comments of Reps. Boyd and Dawes).
182. See id. at 6–7.
183. See id. at 7–8.
184. See id. at 7.
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danger in allowing unsworn representatives-elect to make membership
decisions:
[T]he correct position to be taken is just to swear in every
gentleman who comes here with credentials in due form,
properly authenticated, and to allow him to take a seat . . . .
[T]here may come a time when the parties are so very nearly
equally divided that cases may be got up by which the
organization of the House may be thrown into the hands of a
minority by a trick, as against the right of the majority. By
getting up factious objection to two or three members the
organization of the House may thus be taken away from the
majority and given into the hands of the minority, thereby
precipitating discord, anarchy, and probable ruin to the
Government and the country.185
Marshall’s comments encapsulate the darkest fear at the heart of this
Article: a constitutional coup. But the battle was lost. Just as Kerr’s and
Wood’s objections had fallen on deaf ears, nobody responded to Marshall.186
The venerable Oaths First precedent, hobbled in 1861, had now been supplanted
by the Step Aside precedent.
After everyone else took their oaths, the House voted to seat Dyer and Van
Horn.187 Soon after that, Hamill, Rice, and Winchester were seated and their
cases were referred to the Committee of Elections for further consideration.188
Nothing was gained from the delay; the Oaths First precedent had died for no
good reason. Some might have claimed that the Step Aside process was
expeditious, as it avoided clogging up the House’s state-by-state oathtaking
process, and minimized the awkwardness of voting on motions when only some
states had been sworn in. But the oathtaking process had been clogged up, and
a mixed vote had been taken.
More to the point, it would have been much more expeditious if the disputed
members-elect had just taken their oaths without objection. No great affront
would have occurred; their cases could have been referred to the Committee of
Elections just as easily. Doing things the way they had been done for decades
before 1861 would have yielded the same final result.

185.
186.
187.
188.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 10, 13.
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iii. The Step Aside Process is Normalized (1871–1897)
The Step Aside precedent was bolstered at the 1871 organization. Blaine
was reelected as Speaker.189 Once again, as the members-elect assembled to
take their oaths state by state, multiple objections were leveled.
First, Alfred Waddell, a member-elect from North Carolina, had his loyalty
challenged, prompting Blaine to declare, “Following the course adopted in the
organization of past Houses, the Chair will first swear in those members against
whom no objection whatever is presented.”190 Despite his use of the plural
“Houses,” Blaine was presumably referring only to the 1869 organization. But
the objected-to members-elect in that year stood aside voluntarily.191 Waddell
did not.
The entire Mississippi and Tennessee delegations faced challenges to their
credentials. Apparently in recognition of that controversy, Blaine had put those
states last in line to be sworn in.192 The Tennessee delegation was seated
provisionally, but the Mississippi delegation could not participate in that
vote.193 The Mississippi delegation was also seated provisionally and some of
the just-sworn members of the Tennessee delegation voted on that motion.194 It
was odd that members of the two delegations had been good enough to
participate in the Speaker election based on the Clerk’s initial determination,195
but were not good enough to participate in anything else until their would-be
colleagues allowed it.
The same was true of Waddell—indeed, his case was worse given that his
credentials had been unobjectionable. Once the House was organized and some
other minor matters were handled, Waddell’s case came up for discussion.
After brief debate, the House voted to seat him provisionally and to refer his
case to the Committee of Elections.196 The House would have suffered no
disadvantage from letting Waddell take the oath with the rest of his delegation.
The Step Aside precedent took a firmer hold in the following years:
everyone with valid credentials (to the Clerk’s satisfaction) voted for Speaker,
189. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1871).
190. Id. Blaine turned back a complaint that the objector had not yet been sworn in, noting that
the complainer had not been sworn in either. See id. This was consistent with his statement in the
previous Congress that unsworn members could participate in resolving membership challenges too.
See supra text accompanying note 177.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 178, 182.
192. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1871).
193. See id. at 7; H.R. JOURNAL 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1871).
194. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 7–10 (1871); H.R. JOURNAL 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
9–10 (1871).
195. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 5–6 (1871).
196. See id. at 11–12.
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but then pre-oath objections forced members-elect to stand aside while
everyone else took the oath and then decided the outcasts’ fate. In 1875,197 it
was applied to a credentials dispute and a disputed election.198 When all the
other oaths had been administered, the House immediately debated the two
cases and seated the disputed members.199
In 1877, the Clerk called the roll and explained his handling of various
problematic credentials.200 After the Speaker election,201 as the delegations
swore in state by state, three objectors forced six representatives-elect to stand
aside—five due to questions about their credentials and one due to a disputed
election.202 Over the next three days, the House considered all of the cases and
swore in all of the challenged members-elect.203
With only two exceptions, 1877 would be the last time anyone was made
to step aside because of a challenge to their credentials.204 Going forward, the

197. In 1873 everyone on the roll had had their oaths administered without incident. See 2 CONG.
REC. 6 (1873).
198. Louisiana had two men claiming to be governor and Republican Representative-Elect Frank
Morey bore the credentials of only one of them. See 4 id. at 167 (1875). There were two sets of
credentials from Louisiana, but they named the same person in all but two districts—one district had
two conflicting names, and one district had a winner listed in only one set. Id. Morey was made to
stand aside. See id. So too was Virginia Democratic Representative-Elect John Goode, whose election
was disputed (as well as his credentials, less seriously). See id.
199. See id. at 167–72.
200. See 6 CONG. REC. 51 (1877). In addition, Missouri had sent some sort of communication
to the Speaker, but the Clerk rejected the suggestion that he should stand in for the Speaker and open
it himself. See id. Later, ruling out of order a motion to amend the roll, the Clerk also made a strong
(and seemingly incorrect) statement that only he, not the unsworn members-elect, had the statutory
authority to decide who was on the roll. See id. at 53. But see id. at 61 (comments of Rep. Mills)
(arguing that the House can revise the Clerk’s decision).
201. See id. at 53.
202. See id. at 54.
203. See id. at 59–76, 85–93. In one case, that of California Representative-Elect Romualdo
Pacheco, the objection was withdrawn before the House voted. Id. at 93. The most interesting of the
cases concerned two African-American Representatives-Elect from South Carolina, Republicans
Joseph Rainey and Richard Cain. Rainey, first elected in 1870, was the first African-American ever
to serve in the House. Rainey, Joseph Hayne, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/R/RAINEY,-Joseph-Hayne(R000016)/ [https://perma.cc/U698-854Z]. He had the same sort of credentials to take his seat as the
other members of the delegation, but Democratic state officials elected at the same time communicated
to the House their challenge to the validity of Rainey’s election, asserting that Rainey’s opponent was
entitled to the seat. See 6 CONG. REC. 60–61 (1877). Democrats in Congress used that challenge to
cast doubt on the validity of Rainey’s credentials. After lengthy discussion, the House decided that
Rainey had a prima facie right to the seat, so he was sworn in. See id. at 60–65. Next, Cain’s case was
discussed and resolved in much the same terms, and he too was sworn in. See id. at 64–69.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 231–32, 316–18. (Richardson and Utterback cases).
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Step Aside process was used more purely as a way to handle challenges
regarding elections and qualifications.
In 1879, one representative-elect, Florida Democrat Noble Hull, was made
to stand aside because his election had been highly questionable.205 The House
then seated Hull provisionally (albeit by a narrow, party-line vote), once again
making the departure from the Oaths First precedent needless.206 Near the end
of the term, the Committee on207 Elections unanimously favored Hull’s
opponent, and the House seated him in Hull’s place.208
The 1881 organization saw the fullest debate about the shift to the Step
Aside precedent. Republican Speaker J. Warren Keifer directed Alabama
Democrat Joseph Wheeler209 to stand aside, prompting a challenge from
Pennsylvania Democrat (and former Speaker) Samuel J. Randall.210 Randall
noted that at its official birth in 1869, the Step Aside precedent had been
premised on voluntariness.211 Dudley Haskell responded that the Speaker was
merely following the practice followed in the last two House organizations—
when Randall himself was Speaker.212 Haskell said the Step Aside precedent
“has in it no hardship and debars no member of any right, but facilitates the
organization of this House.”213
Haskell was right that the Step Aside precedent sped things up—compared
to a system in which debates and votes over objections would interrupt the oathtaking process. But if the point was to speed along organization, the Oaths First
precedent would have been even faster. Haskell needed look no further than
the Speaker election. There, everyone on the roll voted, preventing it from
being delayed by objections to anyone’s election. The House had no trouble
with that practice.
More importantly, Haskell was wrong to say that the Step Aside precedent
did not debar people like Wheeler of any rights. To be sure, if Wheeler were
seated immediately after the others’ oaths were taken, he would not have been
205. See 9 CONG. REC. 5–7, 18–28 (1879).
206. See id. at 27–28.
207. The Committee of Elections was referred to predominantly as such until the 1880s, when it
began to be called the Committee on Elections.
208. See ROWELL, supra note 80, at 341–42; DUBIN, supra note 63, at 249 n.2.
209. The Congressional Record makes it difficult to tell who had been sworn in and who was
still a member-elect in 1881, so this Section will not refer to people as either one. The people with
objections against them obviously were all still members-elect, though.
210. See 13 CONG. REC. 9 (1881).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Id.; see also id. at 10. Randall quibbled about the extent to which previous Speakers had
actually ordered people to stand aside. See id.
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prevented from voting on anything (other than his own case, which he would
not have voted on anyway). But nothing guaranteed an immediate vote.214 And
if any other people were challenged (which they would be in 1881), Wheeler
would be “debarred” from voting on their cases if they came up before his.
Regardless, if Haskell really believed that Wheeler was not debarred of any
right—that the Step Aside precedent made no real difference—then what was
the point of using it instead of the Oaths First process?
Speaker Keifer ended the discussion when he characterized his action
simply as deciding the order in which people took the oath, something that was
wholly in his control.215 Keifer had successfully answered the question of
whether he could do this, but he ignored the question of whether he should.
Unlike the Oaths First precedent, the Step Aside precedent prevents people with
valid credentials from taking the oath until and unless their colleagues—people
with credentials no better than theirs—had taken a vote on the question.
Wheeler’s case was just the beginning of the 1881 ordeal. Seven other
members-elect were ordered to stand aside.216 Two of the objections were titfor-tat: Republican John Van Voorhis forced Democrat J. Floyd King to stand
aside, prompting King to force Van Voorhis to stand aside as well.217 After
Republican William Robert Moore forced Democrat James Chalmers aside,
Democrat Edward Bragg—mockingly but officially—forced Moore aside.218
When everyone else had been sworn in, the House turned to Wheeler’s case
first and considered a motion to deny him his seat pending resolution of his case
by the Committee on Elections.219 The other members-elect who had been
forced aside could not vote in Wheeler’s case (contrary to what the Oaths First
process would have wrought). Speaker Keifer had done more than just change
the order in which the oaths were taken.
When it became apparent that Wheeler’s credentials were, in fact,
unobjectionable, his defenders made a strong (and even somewhat bipartisan220)
case for seating him immediately.221 Among other things, they cited a passage
214. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 196 (Waddell case); infra text accompanying notes
320–22 (Shoemaker).
215. See 13 CONG. REC. 10–11 (1881).
216. See id. at 11.
217. See id. King’s ability to object to Van Voorhis was one piece of evidence, at least, to
support Haskell’s notion that those forced to stand aside were not thereby prejudiced. See supra text
accompanying note 213.
218. See 13 CONG. REC. 11 (1881). Bragg derisively imitated the grandiloquent language that
Moore had used in objecting to Chalmers. See id.
219. See id. at 13.
220. See id. at 12–13 (comments of Rep. Robeson).
221. See id. at 11–13.
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from A Treatise on the American Law of Elections, by George McCrary, a
former chair of the Committee on Elections:
If the party holding the ordinary credentials of an office can be
kept out of the office by the mere institution of a contest . . . the
relative strength of political parties in such a body might be
changed by instituting contests against members of one or the
other of such parties.222
A motion was made to keep Wheeler’s seat vacant until the Committee on
Elections could report on the dispute, the House tabled it, and Wheeler was
sworn in.223
The fact that the other seven members-elect facing objections could not
participate in Wheeler’s case was made more galling by the fact that soon after
Wheeler’s case was resolved, five of them were sworn in without a fight after
their objectors withdrew their objections.224 A sixth objector persisted but his
motion was quickly tabled.225 The seventh objection presented a more
complicated (and fascinating) constitutional question, but it too failed.226
While all eight challenged members-elect successfully took their seats, half
of them were later unseated via successful election contests.227 This
underscored the pointlessness of the Step Aside precedent even further—it
delayed organization (during and after the oath) without leading the House
initially to displace even those members-elect who, it turned out later, really did
not belong there.

222. See id. at 12.
223. See id. at 11–13. Wheeler held the seat until June 1882 when, after investigation and debate,
his opponent was awarded the seat. Id. at 4505 (1882); see also ROWELL, supra note 80, at 365–68.
224. See 13 CONG. REC. 13 (1881). One of the five, William Robert Moore, swore in with others
to whom the objections had been dropped, but the Congressional Record does not record his objector’s
withdrawal of his objection.
225. See id. at 13–14.
226. South Carolina’s Second District had initially gone to Democrat Michael O’Connor, in an
election contested by the loser, Republican Edmund Mackey. See DUBIN, supra note 63, at 254, 256
n.23. Before the House could convene to consider Mackey’s contest, O’Connor died. See id. at 256
n.23. The governor declared the seat vacant and called a special election, which Democrat Samuel
Dibble won. See id. at 255, 256 n.23. The question thus presented was whether the governor had the
power to declare the seat vacant when, given the existence of a live contest, the House had not
definitively declared it to be O’Connor’s seat to vacate. See 13 CONG. REC. 15 (1881). It was on this
basis that the objector moved to leave the seat vacant pending resolution of the O’Connor/Dibble–
Mackey contest. See id. The House voted to table that motion and thus to seat Dibble; it did not hold
directly that O’Connor’s credentials would have been good enough to get him seated (and thus that
Dibble’s were as well), but this was the upshot of its decision. See id. Mackey’s contest was eventually
successful, though, and he was seated in place of Dibble a few months later. See DUBIN, supra note
63, at 256 n.23.
227. See supra notes 223, 226; DUBIN, supra note 63, at 256 nn.2, 7, 13 & 23.
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Relative simplicity returned in 1883. When the members-elect were sworn
in only one representative-elect was forced aside, on grounds of his
qualifications.228 The objector withdrew his objection immediately after the
oath, being satisfied merely to refer the issue to the Committee on Elections.229
Going through the Step Aside dance was not necessary, though; between 1885
and 1897, there were scores of contested elections and all were handled without
any pre-oath objections or stepping aside.230
There was one credentials case. In 1893, the Clerk added George
Richardson to the rolls; when new credentials were issued subsequently for
someone else, the Clerk declined to un-enroll Richardson and instead submitted
the matter to the House for its consideration.231 Richardson voted in the
Speaker election, but was made to step aside before taking his oath; his case
was considered extensively the next day before the House voted along party
lines to seat him “on his prima facie case.”232
Another noteworthy issue arose during this period. In 1897, there was some
confusion over duly elected, unchallenged members whose credentials had not
arrived in time to get them onto the roll.233 Some of them requested to be added
to the roll so that they could vote for Speaker, but they were not allowed to do
so.234 Later, the Speaker did not allow them to be sworn in until everyone else
had been seated and could provide unanimous consent.235 This represents an
odd contradiction: An unsworn member can object and thereby prevent another
unsworn member from taking his seat, but even if all of the unsworn members
unanimously wish to add someone to the roll, they can only do so after taking
their seats.

228. See 15 CONG. REC. 5 (1883). The person at issue, Samuel Peters, had been elected while
serving as a state judge, which violated the state constitution. Id. at 5–6.
229. See id. Several other seats were contested only after organization. See ROWELL, supra note
80, at 398–414 (noting numerous other challenges, many of them successful, including one filed the
day after organization).
230. See 17 CONG. REC. 105–07 (1885); 19 id. at 4–7 (1887); 21 id. at 79–81 (1889); 23 id. at
4–5, 7–8 (1891); 28 id. at 2–5 (1895); 30 id. at 13–16 (1897); ROWELL, supra note 80, at 415–580
(surveying cases from 1885 through 1897).
231. See 25 CONG. REC. 200 (1893).
232. Id. at 237; see id. at 201–02, 226–38.
233. See 30 id. at 16 (1897).
234. See id.; cf. 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 30, at 16–17 (explaining that the power to seat people
with certain imperfections in their credentials rests with the House rather than the Clerk). A similar
case of straggling credentials happened in 1889, though it appears that no attempt was made to seat
those people until after everyone else’s oaths had been administered. See 21 CONG. REC. 81 (1889).
235. See 30 CONG. REC. 16 (1897).
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iv. The Lessons of History (1787–1897)
While House organization had evolved in the first fifty-four Houses, two
consistent patterns emerged. The first was reliance on, and deference to, the
Clerk in the first stage of organization. Other than in 1863—when the
underhanded Clerk had plotted against the majority—and in two minor, isolated
exceptions, the people who voted for Speaker were the people that the Clerk
had put on the roll.236 Membership objections only ever came later.
Having an orderly and expeditious Speaker election was more sacrosanct
than policing the legitimacy of the participants in it. In the Broad Seal War in
1839, the non-seating of representatives-elect with bona fide credentials
determined the result of the Speaker election. But 1839 was enshrined as a
cautionary example rather than a respectable precedent. Subsequent House
organizations featured extraordinarily contentious Speaker elections in which
changing a small number of votes would have made a big difference, but the
idea of using seating challenges as a way to sway the results was apparently off
the table.237 If such a laid-back attitude is appropriate for the Speaker elections,
though, why would the House not stick with that approach all the way through
organization?
The other lesson of history from 1789 through 1897 is that forcing people
to stand aside from taking the oath does not accomplish anything. Virtually
every time somebody was prevented from taking the oath of office at the outset,
that person was allowed to be sworn in as soon as everyone else had taken the
oath.238 The only real counterexamples are discreditable: the 1839 Broad Seal
debacle and the 1863 plot.239 Other objections made without pre-oath
objections worked just fine—many led to members being unseated—and
caused no disruption to the House’s organization.240 There was thus no
functional reason to employ the Step Aside process.
If the Step Aside precedent was so pointless, why was it embraced? The
purported reason was that it allowed the swearing-in process to go more
smoothly, and allowed decisions to be made by a sworn-in House instead of an
236. See supra text accompanying notes 143–48. The two exceptions were in 1833, when the
Clerk should not have enrolled the person, and in 1861. See supra text accompanying notes 65–74;
supra note 119.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15.
238. See supra notes 104; supra text accompanying notes 129–30, 187–88, 196, 199, 203, 206,
219–26, 229.
239. See supra Section III.A.iv (1839 case); supra text accompanying notes 140–49 (1863 plot).
An additional, partial counterexample occurred in 1833, in which the Clerk should not have added
Moore to the roll in the first place, and Moore withdrew voluntarily. See supra text accompanying
notes 65–74.
240. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 230.
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unsworn or partially sworn one. But the administration of oaths would have
gone even more smoothly if it had been treated like the Speaker election, with
all objections deferred.
Deferring objections until after the oath has another subtler advantage.
With the Step Aside process, when there are multiple objections the objectedto members-elect cannot vote on each other’s cases. This increases the
incentive for tit-for-tat objections, like the time-wasting ones executed in
1881.241
In sum, things went fine from 1789 through 1859 when pre-oath objections
simply were not made. They would have remained fine had that practice been
maintained from 1861 through 1897.
C. The Widening Gyre (1899–1957)
i. Roberts (1899)
With the Step Aside precedent now entrenched, the House took it to the
next level in 1899 with the case of Representative-Elect Brigham Roberts. The
House’s actions were accompanied by more than the usual amount of
discussion, but that discussion reflected the passions stirred up by the facts of
Roberts’s case, not any sort of technocratic hankering to devise optimal oathtaking procedures.
Two representatives objected to Roberts, who was made to step aside rather
than swear in with the rest of the Utah delegation.242 Unlike previous pre-oath
objections, Roberts faced no questions about his credentials, his election, or his
constitutional qualifications. Rather, the objections were based on Roberts
being a polygamist.243 Roberts’s case was considered the next day by the

241. See supra text accompanying notes 217–18.
242. See 33 CONG. REC. 5 (1899).
243. The first objector, Robert Tayler, said that Roberts was ineligible for office because of his
conviction for “cohabitation” under the Edmunds Law. See Act of Mar. 22, 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-47,
22 Stat. 30, 31–32; 33 CONG. REC. 5 (1899). Roberts had been convicted, and the law purported to
make polygamists (whether or not they had been convicted) ineligible for election to federal office.
Doubts were also raised about the validity of Roberts’s naturalization, but this issue did not figure
significantly in the subsequent debate. See id. at 43–44 (comments of Rep. Richardson) (noting that
the anti-Roberts resolution did not raise the citizenship argument). The second objector, Thomas
McRae, did not even speak about qualifications, instead railing against the “assault” that Roberts’s
election represented on “American womanhood” and “the sacred marriage system of one man to one
woman.” Id. at 5.
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sworn-in House, with Representative Robert Tayler leading the charge against
him.244
The discussion focused both on Roberts’s provisional right to occupy his
seat while the House deliberated and on his ultimate right to take his seat.245
But the House also discussed the precise, narrower question that this Article
considers—which Tayler put as “the right to halt [Roberts] at the bar of the
House during the organization and refuse to administer the oath.”246
Tayler started his argument with the Rice and Winchester case from 1869.
As Tayler depicted it, the partially formed House was poised to vote not to seat
the two men pending final resolution of their cases, but was prevented from
doing so when Rice and Winchester voluntarily stepped aside.247 Tayler
described the House as “squarely in favor of halting at the bar of the House a
person charged with ineligibility, and sending his case at once to committee.”248
But this was disingenuous. Besides ignoring the decades of pre-1869
precedent, Tayler ignored the fact that as soon as the House was sworn in, it
seated Rice and Winchester pending the committee’s consideration of their
case.249
Indeed, from 1869 until 1899, Rice, Winchester, and every other similarly
situated person were sworn in almost immediately after the House was
organized.250 Tayler tried to distinguish these other cases, saying that they were
either dismissed on the merits (incorrect) or were about disputed election results
rather than qualifications (also incorrect).251 In the end, the precedents Tayler
244. See 33 CONG. REC. 38–53 (1899). Tayler’s argument touched on many other issues. One
was the validity of statutes that purported, as the Edmunds Act did, to add qualifications for office
beyond those specified in the Constitution. Another was that, regardless of the validity of the Edmunds
Act’s disqualification provision, Congress could simply refuse to seat a criminal, effectively adding a
qualification on the fly as it had done in pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases involving disloyal
Southerners.
245. Among other things, Tayler argued that it was inappropriate to seat Roberts and then expel
him, since Tayler said that expulsion should be limited to official misconduct, or at least to acts
committed after one’s election. See id. at 39.
246. Id. at 41.
247. See id.; supra text accompanying note 182.
248. See 33 CONG. REC. 42 (1899).
249. See supra text accompanying note 188.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 187–88, 196, 199, 203, 206, 219–26, 229. Indeed, as
Tayler apparently realized, Rice and Winchester were seated before the House had elected its Clerk
and other officers. See 33 CONG. REC. 42 (1899) (comments of Rep. Tayler).
251. See 33 CONG. REC. 42 (1899). Tayler also mentioned the 1871 cases of the Georgia
delegation (which had not been enrolled and whose credentials were in question, though this all
happened after organization) and Rep. Waddell. See id. at 42–43; supra text accompanying notes 190–
91, 196 (discussing Waddell). Tayler’s point about elections versus qualifications was that a disputed
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cited provided no support for his notion that the unorganized House should
refuse to seat people with valid credentials pending consideration of their
qualifications.
Strikingly, Tayler did not cite the clearest example of people at organization
actually being denied their seats pending consideration of their cases—the 1839
New Jersey debacle. That case represented (and still represents) the most potent
act of an unorganized, unsworn House deciding membership, denying people
with valid credentials their seats because of an electoral dispute, and doing so
in a way that tipped the partisan control of the House.252 Tayler’s failure to cite
the 1839 organization underscores just how discredited a precedent it was
understood to be. As the leading election-law treatise at the time, George
McCrary’s, put it:
The principal, and almost the only case, in which the lower
house of Congress has ever denied to a person holding regular
credentials, the right to be sworn and to take his seat pending
the contest, is the celebrated New Jersey Case . . . . It is so
clearly wrong and as a precedent, so exceedingly dangerous,
that the House has not hesitated to disregard it entirely on every
occasion since when the question has arisen.253
Representative James D. Richardson responded to Tayler. He made no
effort to defend Roberts on the merits, saying that Roberts should not retain his
seat if he was guilty of polygamy.254 But, Richardson said, “[n]o severer
condemnation can be pronounced against a member . . . than to deny him the
right to be sworn when this House is being organized.”255 Richardson also
noted that, like all other enrolled members-elect, Roberts had been enjoying the
privileges of that status—including drawing a salary and enjoying the franking
privilege—since the congressional term had begun nine months earlier.256
(Roberts had also voted in the Speaker election.257) Richardson waved off the
election was not reason enough to prevent someone with valid credentials from taking his seat, but that
questionable qualifications were. But one 1869 objectee, A.A.C. Rogers, had been challenged
regarding both his election and his citizenship. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1869); 33
CONG. REC. 45 (1899) (comments of Rep. Richardson making this point). And Waddell’s 1871 case
concerned his loyalty (a qualification). See supra text accompanying notes 190–91.
252. See supra Section III.A.iv.
253. GEORGE W. MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS 236 (Henry
L. McCune ed., 4th ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1897).
254. See 33 CONG. REC. 44 (1899). Richardson won applause with his declaration that the
American people were united in their belief that “the homes of our people and their domestic relations
shall be forever preserved in all their loveliness, sweetness, and purity.” Id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 5.
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precedents Tayler had cited and offered other, more pertinent precedents
instead.258
Some members, while condemning Roberts’s conduct, called for him to be
seated pending any further action, based on the fact that he had valid credentials
and met the constitutional qualifications for office.259 This proceduralist
position seemed sincere—nobody wanted Roberts in the House, but the
question remained of how best to achieve that result. Seemingly more popular,
though, were assertions like those from Representative John Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald (who focused only on whether to seat Roberts pending consideration
of his case, and not on the issue of seating him at organization) thundered his
opposition to Roberts sitting in the House “even for a minute.”260 Fitzgerald
ranged back and forth regarding Mormonism itself,261 but was clear in his
notion that family values were paramount, and that there was ample precedent
for refusing to seat someone for whom charges were pending.262
Tayler had the last word and sardonically disdained the Oaths First
process’s notion that anyone with facially valid credentials should be allowed
to take the oath:
Our friends upon the other side of the House . . . are here today worshiping as they have ever worshiped under other forms
and for other purposes the fetich [sic] of a certificate. . . . If the
King of the Cannibal Islands, panoplied with his club and with
his feathers, marched down the aisle with a certificate of the
governor of Tennessee, we must stand here appalled by the
spectacle, and say, “Mr. Speaker, swear him in.” [Laughter
and applause on the Republican side.]
....
If a boy 10 years old walked down the aisle presenting a
certificate as a member-elect from a district in the State of
Arkansas, my friend from Arkansas who has just spoken would

258. See id. at 44. One was the case of Joseph Rainey, which Richardson might have included
as an appeal to Republicans; opposition to Rainey had likely been racially based and Richardson could
quote good Republicans defending Rainey’s prima facie right to a seat based on his credentials. See
id. at 45; supra note 203. Another was the 1873 case of George Cannon, a non-voting delegate from
what was then the Utah Territory. Like Roberts, Cannon was challenged because of his polygamy;
unlike Roberts, he was seated pending further consideration of his case. See 33 CONG. REC. 44–45
(1899).
259. See, e.g., 33 CONG. REC. 50 (1899) (comments of Rep. Dinsmore).
260. Id. at 51.
261. Compare id. at 50 (“I do not oppose Mr. Roberts on account of his religious views. Mr.
King, who served so ably in the last House, was a Mormon.”), with id. at 51 (“Mormonism is the curse
of this country to-day. It is nothing else than legalized licentiousness and corruption.”).
262. See id.
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say, “The absurdity of this certificate is manifest, but we must
swear him in.” If Li Hung Chang should march down this aisle
with a certificate, that certificate must be respected.263
Tayler’s assault on precedent was apparently a compelling one to his
colleagues. The resolution to keep Roberts out pending final resolution of his
case passed overwhelmingly, 304 to 32.264 To seat someone with valid
credentials at organization, leaving objections to them to be handled later,
requires a high level of self-restraint. That self-restraint simply was not present
in Roberts’s case given the revulsion felt toward polygamy and given Roberts’s
failure to deny the charges against him.
In conjunction with the resolution, the House appointed a special committee
to report on Roberts’s case.265 The committee’s report focused mainly on
Roberts’s ultimate right to his seat, but it did pause to consider whether Roberts
should have been able to take the oath with everyone else.266 The report
dismissed the objection that allowing pre-oath objections could lead to conflict,
confusion, and the “arbitrary and unjust exercise of power” by the House.267
The committee concluded that the House could bar Roberts at organization,
because those with valid credentials can participate in the House’s organization
even before being sworn; the majority had the same power over Roberts before
any oaths were taken as it did after.268
The committee was correct that when the will of the majority is clear, it will
prevail regardless of when in the process the majority expresses that will. The
committee relied entirely on this point, saying that if Roberts had been the first
one called to swear in, and had faced an objection, all of the unsworn members
could had voted on Roberts right then—the results would have been the same
as in the actual case, in which those same people voted only after taking their
oaths.269 But this works both ways; if timing is irrelevant, then there is no
reason not to wait until after the oath to make objections.
263. Id. Li Hongzhang was a Chinese politician, general, and diplomat. See Li Hongzhang,
VICTORIA’S CHINATOWN, https://chinatown.library.uvic.ca/index.html%3Fq=li_hongzhang.html
[https://perma.cc/CS28-7LTA]. Elsewhere, notably, Tayler conceded that Roberts’s facially valid
credentials entitled him (and, by extension, the King of the Cannibal Islands et al.) to participate in the
House’s organization, including the Speaker election. See Robert W. Taylor [sic], The Roberts Case
As Illustrating a Great Prerogative of Congress, 10 YALE L.J. 37, 44–45 (1900).
264. See 33 CONG. REC. 52–53 (1899). A more favorable vote had come just before on an
unsuccessful amendment moved by Richardson that would have allowed Roberts to be seated pending
consideration of his case. That vote was 59 to 247. See id. at 52.
265. See id. at 52–53.
266. See H.R. REP. NO. 56-85, at 6 (1900).
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 7.
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Moreover, timing is not irrelevant. The committee’s claim to the contrary
denigrated the significance of the oath. It ignored that objectionable people will
have already voted in the Speaker election. And it ignored the fact that the Step
Aside process changes who can vote when there are multiple members-elect
facing objections.
More problematic, though, was the Roberts committee’s claim that a
majority had never used its power to wreak an injustice.270 This is a
meaningless point if the majority gets to define what constitutes an injustice.
Worse, it overlooks the risk of a minority seeking to become a majority by
manipulating the roll. Majority control had flipped in the 1839 debacle,271 and
it threatened to do so under the 1863 Etheridge conspiracy.272 The point is not
that the 1839 and 1863 organizations make it clear what the proper procedures
should be. The point is that the committee did not address those obviously
important precedents at all. By dodging the question, the committee made it
appear that the Step Aside process was simple, obvious, and unproblematic. In
fact, it is none of those things.
In the final part of its argument about votes at organization, the committee
quoted George McCrary’s treatise in support of the Step Aside process.273 But
as the committee itself noted, McCrary was describing the House’s practice,
not defending it.274 If McCrary had published his treatise in 1855 instead of
1875, it would have said just as definitively that everyone with valid credentials
swears in, with objections lodged only afterwards. But McCrary and the
committee were correct that the Step Aside precedent was now entrenched.
ii. The Post-Roberts Era: Precedent, Resistance, and Silence (1901–1957)
The first objection of the post-Roberts era was not lodged until 1913; H.
Olin Young of Michigan was forced to step aside.275 After everyone else swore
270. See id.
271. See supra Section III.A.iv.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 143–49.
273. See H.R. REP. NO. 56-85, at 7; MCCRARY, supra note 253, at 239 (containing the cited
passage); see also supra text accompanying note 222; supra note 253 (noting other citations to
McCrary).
274. See H.R. REP. NO. 56-85, at 7.
275. See 50 CONG. REC. 64 (1913). There were no pre-oath objections from 1901 through 1911.
See 35 id. at 43–45 (1901); 37 id. at 146–48 (1903); 40 id. at 38–41 (1905); 42 id. at 3–5 (1907); 44
id. at 16–19 (1909); 47 id. at 4–7 (1911). In 1905, the Clerk turned away an attempt to add to the roll
someone whose certificate had been lost, but whose presence was apparently not disputed; there was
not unanimous consent for adding him to the roll, so he was made to wait until after everyone else had
sworn in. See 40 id. at 40–41 (1905); cf. supra text accompanying notes 233–35 (describing situation
in which such an addition was not permitted even with unanimous consent). In 1919, the same situation
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in, the House voted by a strong majority to let Young take his oath pending
consideration of his case.276
In 1919, Victor Berger was made to stand aside.277 Once the oath had been
administered to everyone else, the objector introduced a resolution to bar
Berger from his seat pending consideration of his case, cited the Roberts case,
and moved to end any debate.278 The resolution was then adopted without any
discussion; during this whirlwind Berger attempted unsuccessfully to speak.279
With the Roberts case as an accepted precedent for excluding criminals—and
not even seating them pending consideration of the case—Berger never had a
chance.
At no point were the actual charges against Berger recited, let alone
debated. Also undiscussed were any principles about the proper order of
operations vis-à-vis objections, seating, and the oath. The objector said only
that Berger was ineligible and that there were “public records and papers”
supporting that conclusion.280 But Berger’s story surely was well known to all
present: he had fervently and publicly opposed America’s participation in
World War I.281 For this, Berger was indicted under the Espionage Act, but
while under indictment he was elected to the House. Then Berger was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to twenty years in prison (he was free pending appeal
when the House convened).282 The House later decided to deny Berger his seat
as a final matter, and when he won the special election to fill the resulting
vacancy, the House refused again to seat him.283
The Step Aside process continued to be used throughout the 1920s, though
in each instance it occasioned some pushback. In 1921, after the Speaker
election and during the oath, an objection was made to Kansas Republican
Richard Bird, alleging that he had spent more money on his campaign than was
allowed by law.284 The Speaker directed Bird to stand aside, prompting
Republican Representative (and House Minority Leader) James Mann to
comment that he did not think anyone had the right to make someone stand
arose, except this time there was unanimous consent to add the uncredentialed-but-uncontested
members to the roll, after the Speaker election and before the oath. See 58 CONG. REC. 8 (1919).
276. See 50 CONG. REC. 65–67 (1913).
277. See 58 id. at 8 (1919). There were no pre-oath objections in 1915 or 1917. See 53 id. at 4–
6 (1915); 55 id. at 105–08 (1917).
278. See 58 id. at 9 (1919).
279. See id. at 8–9.
280. See 58 CONG. REC. 9 (1919).
281. See EXCLUSION CASES, supra note 52, at 81–82.
282. See id. at 83.
283. See id. at 89.
284. See 61 CONG. REC. 80 (1921).
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aside “because all Members with credentials are on an equal basis in the
House.”285 Mann did not formally object to Bird standing aside temporarily,
though.286 The objector noted that Bird being made to stand aside was
consistent with the Roberts, Young, and Berger precedents.287 Mann replied
that there had been acquiescence in those cases (a debatable point) but that,
regardless, objections should wait until after the oath. “[O]therwise,” he said,
“I might object to the whole Democratic side of the House being sworn in.”288
Mann was right, but the question was rendered moot when Bird stepped aside
consensually.289
Others tried to discuss the merits of the case, prompting the Speaker to say
that precedent made it clear that Bird should be allowed to step aside, and his
case decided after everyone else had sworn in.290 That is what then happened:
after everyone else took the oath, the House decided after a brief debate to seat
Bird immediately.291 During that debate, Mann spoke up against pre-oath
objections, again warning against the possibility of tit-for-tat objections, and
worrying that the Step Aside process might someday be used to change party
control of the House.292 He concluded with an apparently stirring defense of
the Oaths First principle: “His credentials are as good as mine; they are as good
as the credentials of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. FLOOD]; they are as
good as anybody else’s credentials, and he is entitled to take his seat now.”293
Probably because the issue was moot at that point, nobody responded to
Mann’s points in detail. One member did say, however, that the objection to
Bird had to be made when it was, as there was no election contest in his case.294
This notion (that in the absence of an election contest, objections must be made
to a member before he or she swears in) pops up elsewhere in discussions of
House organization.295 There is, however, no obvious origin of this notion.
More to the point, there is no obvious basis for it. Even if timeliness requires
that an objection be registered before a member is sworn in, it does not follow
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 80–82.
292. See id. at 81.
293. See id. The Congressional Record noted applause on the Republican side following Mann’s
statement.
294. See id. at 80.
295. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Step Aside process as an alternative
to the formal election-contest process for the House to obtain jurisdiction over an election challenge).
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that timeliness requires the objected-to member to stand aside during the
oath.296
At organization in 1923,297 an objection led a Republican member-elect
from Illinois, Edward Miller, to stand aside.298 Another Illinoisan, ten-termer
Martin Madden, complained, saying that there was no reason for someone with
proper credentials and no charges against him to be made to stand aside. The
Speaker replied that this was “the custom that has always been followed.”299
He said that if Madden continued to object the House could take up the matter,
but that very few people had sworn in at that point.300 Madden continued to
object but the discussion wound around, a Democrat from Illinois was also
made to step aside, and the oath-taking proceeded without the two Illinoisans—
and also without a vote on Madden’s objection.301 Once everyone else was
sworn in, Madden immediately moved to seat Miller (permanently, not just
pending consideration of his case) and successfully moved to end debate by a
strongly party-line vote, without yielding to allow any discussion of Miller’s
case.302 His motion to seat Miller passed.303 At that point, the objection to
Miller’s Democratic colleague was withdrawn and he swore in as well.304
After an uneventful 1925,305 there was a pre-oath objection in 1927 to
Pennsylvania Republican James Beck.306 Beck was asked to step aside instead
of being ordered to, and he complied.307 After everyone else had been sworn
in, Beck’s case was discussed and, just as in 1921 and 1923, a member spoke
out against according members-elect the right to object to other members-elect

296. See infra Section IV.B (critiquing current practice for this reason).
297. The Speaker’s election was difficult, requiring nine ballots over three days. See 65 CONG.
REC. 8–15 (1923). Nobody attempted during those three days to challenge any member-elect’s place
on the roll. Before the Speaker election, Member-Elect Edward Browne asked, “[B]efore casting a
ballot, is it not necessary to swear in the Members?” Id. at 8. Browne should have known better; he
was about to start his sixth term. Also before the Speaker election, during the Clerk’s roll call, the
Clerk noted several issues with the Texas delegation, which he passed along to the House. Id. at 7.
298. See id. at 16; H.R. JOURNAL, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1923). The House Journal records
Miller’s action as voluntary, but the Congressional Record does not.
299. See 65 CONG. REC. 16 (1923).
300. See id.
301. See id. The Democrat, James Buckley, may have stood aside voluntarily. See supra note
298.
302. See 65 CONG. REC. 16, 18 (1923).
303. See id. at 18.
304. See id.
305. See 67 id. at 378–82 (1926).
306. See 69 id. at 8 (1927).
307. See id.; H.R. JOURNAL, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1927).
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taking the oath.308 In the ensuing debate, Victor Berger chimed in that he had
been treated similarly—he meant to needle the Republicans complaining now
who had had no trouble treating Berger the same way eight years earlier.309
Berger joined with the majority in seating Beck permanently without Beck’s
case even being referred to committee.310
There were no pre-oath objections in 1929, despite a controversy from
Texas noted by the Clerk during the roll call.311 Notably, though, Speaker
Nicholas Longworth changed the oath-taking procedure so that all members
would swear in at once instead of state by state.312 Given that the Step Aside
process was meant in part to expedite the state-by-state process,313 this change
could have prompted a move away from pre-oath objections. But it did not.
Pre-oath objections returned to the scene in 1933,314 notwithstanding the
newly en masse administration of the oath, and notwithstanding the pressing
New Deal legislation awaiting Congress. John Utterback and Francis
Shoemaker, Democrats from Maine and Minnesota respectively, were asked to
step aside.315
Utterback was the subject of an election contest and did not have regular
credentials.316 In the debate after the oath, the objector conceded that the
Democrats had a large majority with which to exert their will, but asked for the
sake of future precedent that the House adhere to its tradition and not seat
somebody who lacked valid credentials.317 But the Democratic majority did

308. See 69 CONG. REC. 9 (1927).
309. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 277–79.
310. See 69 CONG. REC. 9–10 (1927).
311. See 71 id. at 21–25 (1929).
312. See id. at 25. Longworth may have done this as a way to head off Southern objections to
seating Illinois Representative Oscar De Priest, the first African-American representative elected in
thirty years. See OFFICE OF HISTORY & PRES., BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870–2007, H.R.
DOC. NO. 108-224, at 280 (2008).
313. See supra text accompanying 215 (showing the Speaker’s depiction of the Step Aside
process as just changing the order in which oaths are taken).
314. There were no objections in 1931. See 75 CONG. REC. 6–9 (1931).
315. See 77 id. at 71 (1933). The Congressional Record gives no indication that the men stood
aside voluntarily, but the House Journal reported that they did. See H.R. JOURNAL, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1933).
316. See 77 CONG. REC. 71 (1933). It is unclear why the Clerk put Utterback on the roll. The
governor and three of the seven members of the state canvassing board believed Utterback to be the
winner, but without a majority of the canvassing board backing him the governor would not issue him
credentials. The governor sent the Clerk a tabulation of the election results, with a conclusion that
Utterback was “apparently elected.” See id.; L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-194,
CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1933 TO 2009, at 5 (2010).
317. See 77 CONG. REC. 72 (1933).
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exert its will, and Utterback was seated pending review of the election contest
despite his imperfect credentials.318
The objection to Shoemaker was that he was a convicted felon, which
allegedly made him ineligible for public office under Minnesota law.319 The
objection apparently surprised Shoemaker’s defenders, so while they
maintained that his credentials should have entitled him to swear in, they asked
that the matter be put off until the next day.320 This delay was unusual when
compared to the relatively swift consideration these cases had historically
gotten, but there was another factor: the urgency of President Roosevelt’s
agenda.321 The next day, the House eventually returned to the Shoemaker
matter and, after a surprisingly lengthy debate, decided to seat him pending
final consideration of his case.322
The next pre-oath objection was in 1937.323 Once again it occasioned a
complaint about such objections, followed by a successful motion immediately
after the oath to seat the objectee without reservation.324
Perhaps because of the futility of the seven pre-oath objections made after
Berger’s case in 1919, and perhaps because of the resonance of the grumbling
about the Step Aside process that followed those objections, there were no preoath objections between 1939 and 1957.325 There was no shortage of post-oath
objections during this time, though.326 As such, it might have been tempting to
think that the Oaths First process had been restored. Alas, that was not the case.
D. The Modern Era Part I: The Chambers, Powell, and McIntyre Messes
(1959–1985)
The state of affairs in 2021 has two features: (1) maintaining that memberselect can be forced to stand aside while everyone else takes the oath, and (2)
not ever actually doing that. The first part of this formula was cemented with

318. See id. at 72–73.
319. See id. at 74.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 111–39.
323. There were no pre-oath objections in 1935. See 79 id. at 9–12 (1935).
324. See 81 id. at 13 (1937). The objection was to Arthur Jenks, apparently based on an election
contest; Jenks’s credentials were fine, though the contest eventually succeeded and Jenks was later
unseated. See id.; WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 11–12.
325. See 84 CONG. REC. 9–12 (1939); 87 id. at 5–7 (1941); 89 id. at 4–7 (1943); 91 id. at 6–9
(1945); 93 id. at 33–37 (1947); 95 id. at 7–9 (1949); 97 id. at 5–8 (1951); 99 id. at 11–14 (1953); 101
id. at 7–10 (1955); 103 id. at 44–46 (1957).
326. See WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 12–21 (collecting dozens of cases).
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three troubling cases between 1961 and 1985: Chambers, Powell, and McIntyre.
The second part has come in the thirty-six years since then.
i. Chambers (1961)
1959 saw a return to the practice of pre-oath objections after a twenty-twoyear lull. Thomas Dale Alford, an independent Democrat from Arkansas facing
an election contest, was made to step aside.327 Immediately after the oath, and
without debate, he was seated pending consideration of his final right to the
seat.328
The 1961 organization broke new ground. Three representatives-elect were
made to stand aside: Indiana Republican George Chambers, Oklahoma
Democrat Victor Wickersham, and Missouri Democrat Morgan Moulder.329
Consistent with recent practice, after everyone else swore in, Wickersham and
Moulder were seated without any debate, after successful motions to seat
them.330
But Chambers was the victim of a surprising breach of precedent: not only
was he forced to step aside despite having valid credentials and despite having
voted for Speaker, he was not seated right after the oath either.331 Previous
similar cases—most notably Brigham Roberts’s—were justified on grounds
that they concerned qualifications, not an election challenge.332 A member
whose election is questionable may or may not belong in the House; in contrast,
an unqualified person has no place in the House, by definition. But Chambers’s
case was a mere election challenge.
Before Chambers, the only other representatives-elect with valid
credentials who were denied their seats pending an election challenge were the
ones involved in the discredited 1839 New Jersey case.333 Despite the highly
unusual character of Chambers’s treatment, though, there was no discussion.
The House voted along party lines to have no debate and then decided (by a
sparse vote of 205 to 95) to leave the contested seat unoccupied pending further
investigation.334

327. See 105 CONG. REC. 14 (1959); WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 21–22.
328. See 105 CONG. REC. 14 (1959).
329. See 107 id. at 22–23 (1961).
330. See id. at 24–25. It is unclear what the nature of the objections to Wickersham and Moulder
were. See WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 23.
331. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-513, at 3 (1961); 107 CONG. REC. 23–24 (1961).
332. See supra note 251.
333. See supra Section III.A.iv.
334. See 107 CONG. REC. 23–24 (1961).
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Months later, the committee recounted the ballots and recommended
reversing Chambers’s state-certified victory in favor of his opponent, J. Edward
Roush.335 While the committee accepted this new count unanimously, the
Republican members of the committee appended “additional views” to the
report that decried the decision to leave the seat empty for five months instead
of seating Chambers provisionally based on his credentials.336 They also
recounted how the Clerk, at the behest of Democratic leaders, had prepared and
circulated (only to Democrats) a document that contradicted the state returns
and showed that Roush was the rightful winner.337 This, they argued
convincingly, was unseemly, especially when juxtaposed with the party-line
vote to prevent debate on the Chambers motion.338
When the full House considered the committee’s report, the debate mainly
centered on the question of which candidate should have the final right to the
seat, but Republicans did repeat their complaints about the Clerk’s conduct, and
about the failure to seat the credentialed Chambers at organization or to allow
any debate.339 Allegedly, the document that the Clerk had circulated had led at
least some Democrats to think that both Chambers and Roush had credentials;
had that been the case, the decision to deny Chambers his seat both before and
after the oath would have made sense, even under the Oaths First process.340
But it was not the case, and the lack of debate at the time made it impossible
for anyone to dispel any such misconceptions.
On the Democratic side, some members tried to justify the departure from
precedent. One stated, weakly, that the final result of the recount justified the
decision not to seat Chambers.341 Another, Majority Leader McCormack,
pointed to the suspicions that had been raised about the election results at the
time the House convened.342 In a perfunctory way, McCormack also
distinguished the precedents the minority had cited, saying that they related to
qualifications rather than elections—ignoring that this distinction made the case
for seating Chambers at organization not weaker but stronger.343
In the end, the House approved the resolution to seat Roush 138 to 51.344
Not only had the debate failed to engage—let alone refute—the precedents that
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See H.R. REP. NO. 87-513, at 1–2.
See id. at 65–67.
See id. at 68–69.
See id. at 67–69.
See 107 CONG. REC. 10,379, 10,382–84, 10,386–87, 10,389–90 (1961).
See id. at 10,383.
See id. at 10,382.
See id. at 10,386.
See id.; see supra note 251; supra text accompanying note 332.
See 107 CONG. REC. 10,391 (1961).
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the House’s actions contravened, most of the House apparently was not even
there.
ii. Powell (1967)
The 1965 organization saw a return to form.345 The entire Mississippi
delegation (because of a dispute over an alternate election) and one Democratic
member-elect from New York (because of campaign-finance issues) were
challenged before the oath. Consistent with recent practice, the objectors did
not state the nature of their objections, saying only that they based them “upon
facts and statements which [they] consider[ed] . . . reliable.”346 The others then
swore in, and Democratic leader Carl Albert successfully moved to seat the five
Mississippians on grounds that their credentials had been filed in due form.347
Then, the New Yorker, Richard Ottinger, was seated by a vote with no
debate.348
At 1967’s organization, all of the previous history discussed in this Article
came to a head with the case of New York Democrat Adam Clayton Powell.
There were actually two members-elect forced to stand aside that day: Powell
and Georgia Republican Benjamin Blackburn. Blackburn, whose election was
being contested, was treated in the conventional manner: after Powell’s case
was resolved Blackburn was seated pending final consideration of his election,
without debate.349
By contrast, Powell’s case occasioned significant discussion. There was no
debate when California Democrat Lionel Van Deerlin “demand[ed]” that
Powell step aside—the whole point of forcing people to stand aside was to
avoid debate so that the oath could be administered promptly.350 But after
everyone else (other than Blackburn) had taken their oaths, Powell’s colleagues
had plenty to say.
Representative Morris Udall introduced the sort of resolution that, in most
other Step Aside cases, would quickly pass (and in Blackburn’s case, would
soon pass): he simply called for Powell’s case to be sent to committee for
further consideration, and for Powell to be seated in the meantime.351 Udall did

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

There were no pre-oath challenges in 1963. See 109 CONG. REC. 10–13 (1963).
111 id. at 18–19 (1965); WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 24–26.
See 111 CONG. REC. 19–20 (1965).
See id. at 20.
See 113 id. at 27 (1967).
See id. at 14.
See id. at 14–15.
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not defend Powell’s conduct—indeed, nobody did that day besides Powell
himself.352
But Powell’s opponents resisted. They argued that the record was clear and
that the House had the power to declare Powell’s criminality a disqualification
from taking his seat.353 While they conceded that precedent supported initially
seating credentialed members-elect pending election challenges, they said that
it was entirely appropriate to deprive a credentialed member-elect of his seat
based on qualifications.354 One representative, in making an argument of this
sort, confidently but erroneously asserted, “[t]here are no precedents—no
precedents—for seating a Member and putting him in limbo pending
investigation.”355 In fact, there were multiple precedents for seating a member
pending further investigation, including at organization.356 These precedents
also belied another expressed concern—that seating Powell would mean it
would require expulsion to unseat him.357
The Step Aside process had become fully accepted. While Powell’s
advocates argued that he should be sworn in pending final consideration of his
case,358 nobody (except perhaps Powell) argued that he should have been able
to swear in with everyone else.359
After a long debate, the House voted by a wide margin to defeat Udall’s
resolution and instead to leave Powell’s seat empty pending final disposition of
his case.360 Later, the committee investigated and recommended seating
352. See id. at 23. Powell had corruptly abused his position as a committee chairman and the
Democratic caucus had already decided to strip him of that post. See id. at 16. There were also
questions raised about his residency: in an apparent effort to evade service of process in New York,
Powell resided in Bimini and returned to his district only on Sundays (taking advantage of the state
law that precluded serving process on Sundays). See id. at 21 (comments of Rep. Kupferman); Powell,
Adam Clayton, Jr., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/19872 [https://perma.cc/JG3C-GRC5].
353. See 113 CONG. REC. 18–19 (1967).
354. See, e.g., id. at 18 (comments of Rep. Ford); id. at 21 (comments of Rep. Goodell).
355. Id. (comments of Rep. Goodell); see also id. (comments of Rep. Goodell) (“There is not a
single precedent in the annals of the House for seating a man whose qualifications have been
questioned under these circumstances before his trial.”).
356. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 168–80, 188, 193–94, 196, 228–29, 318, 322.
357. See 113 CONG. REC. 19 (1967) (comments of Rep. Van Deerlin) (advocating for excluding
Powell because the alternative was expulsion, which would be impossible); id. at 21 (comments of
Rep. Goodell) (same).
358. See, e.g., id. at 16 (comments of Rep. Udall); id. at 18 (comments of Rep. Albert); id. at 20
(comments of Rep. Scheuer); id. at 22 (comments of Rep. Ryan).
359. Powell said, “You talk about my qualifications. There has been no bill of particulars.
Someone can rise 2 years from now and use the same phrase, ‘qualifications’ on any of you without a
bill of particulars and you would not be seated.” Id. at 23.
360. See id. at 24, 26–27.

KALT_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SWEARING IN THE PHOENIX

53

Powell—they found that he met all of the constitutional qualifications for
office, including residency—but punishing him.361 The full House rejected that
recommendation, and voted instead to exclude Powell.362 The district held a
special election to fill the vacancy; Powell won it, but given the House’s
obvious predisposition against seating him he did not bother to show up.363
Powell was elected again in 1968 and appeared for the 1969 organization.364
He again was made to step aside,365 and again the House, once sworn in, debated
what to do with him. This time, tracking the recommendations of the committee
that the House had rejected two years earlier, the House decided to seat Powell
but fine him and strip him of his seniority.366
A few months later, the Supreme Court announced its decision that the
House’s 1967 exclusion of Powell had been illegitimate.367 The Court held that
while the Constitution made the House the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members (so that the Court would not review House
decisions on such matters), the Constitution did not allow the House to create
new qualifications.368 Given that Powell’s constitutional qualifications were
undisputed, the Court said, the House should have seated him.369
The Supreme Court did not speak to whether Powell should have been made
to stand aside at organization. This made perfect sense, as nothing in Powell’s
case turned on whether he should have been pushed out immediately before or
immediately after the other members took their oaths. Moreover, the Court
probably would have considered the House’s timing a political question, and
left it to the House to resolve.370 Nevertheless, the Powell decision made
important changes to the landscape this Article contemplates.
The Court’s decision undermined several key exclusion precedents. By
holding that the House could not exclude a duly elected representative-elect for
being a criminal, the Powell Court essentially rejected the decision to exclude

361. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-27, at 32–33 (1967).
362. See 113 CONG. REC. 5019–20, 5037–38 (1967).
363. See Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr., supra note 352.
364. See 115 CONG. REC. 12 (1969).
365. See id. at 15.
366. See id. at 23–24 (likening similar resolution to committee’s recommendations); id. at 33–
34 (introducing and approving slightly modified resolution).
367. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969).
368. See id. at 550.
369. See id.
370. Cf. McIntyre v. O’Neill, 603 F. Supp. 1053 (D.D.C.), vacating as moot 766 F.2d 535 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). The court in McIntyre rejected plaintiff’s case as a nonjusticiable political question. The
plaintiff was credentialed as the winner of his House race, and was challenging the House’s refusal to
seat him pending its resolution of the election contest. See id.; infra Section III.D.iii.
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not only Adam Clayton Powell, but also Brigham Roberts and Victor Berger.
Roberts, Berger, and Powell are the only three people ever excluded at
organization (that is, denied their seats on qualifications grounds) pending final
consideration of their cases.371 Everyone else who was ever forced to step aside
on qualifications grounds was seated by the House shortly after it was
organized.372 As such, while an objector at organization can say that it is House
practice for representatives-elect not to take the oath when someone objects to
their qualifications, every such precedent was either a waste of time (because
the objectee was seated immediately after the oath) or was invalidated by the
Powell Court.
This aspect of Powell had a prospective effect as well: going forward, it
greatly reduced the scope of possible qualifications-based objections to wouldbe representatives.373 In the fifty years since Powell, there have not been any
serious qualifications-based challenges leveled at representatives, let alone any
brought during organization.374
The fact that qualifications-based challenges are unlikely cuts both ways,
though. A well-designed procedure would cover qualifications challenges,
even if they are unlikely to occur. But infrequency makes it much more difficult
to construct routines or build institutional memory.
There was another development during this period: passage of the Federal
Contested Elections Act of 1969 (FCEA).375 This statute updated the formal
process through which a losing candidate can contest the election result and
seek to be seated in the winner’s stead. Filing an FCEA contest puts the ball in
the House’s court; even if the contestee has been sworn in without objection,
the contest can later lead the House to unseat the contestee and seat the
contestant in his place.376 Almost all election challenges follow FCEA
procedures.377 But not all of them do, and objecting to a member-elect’s

371. A complete compilation of exclusion cases to 1973 is available in EXCLUSION CASES, supra
note 52, at 2–116. The compilation shows that other than Roberts, Berger, and Powell, the only people
excluded pending consideration of their case were ones who had not shown up until after the House
was already organized.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 168–82, 188, 190–91, 196, 228–29, 284–91, 298–303,
306–10, 319–22, 346–48.
373. See supra note 10 (listing constitutional qualifications for representatives).
374. See Known House Cases Involving Qualifications for Membership, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Qualifications/
Qualifications-for-Membership-Cases [https://perma.cc/6QHV-5J7B].
375. 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96.
376. See WHITAKER, supra note 27, at 5.
377. See id. at 9.
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swearing in is cited as an additional way to give the House jurisdiction to
consider a challenge.378
iii. McIntyre (1985)
The Step Aside process was not deployed at any House organization
between 1971 and 1983.379 But in 1985, after the Speaker election and before
the oath, Indiana Republican Richard McIntyre and Idaho Democrat Richard
Stallings were objected to and ordered to step aside while everyone else took
their oaths.380
McIntyre had narrowly defeated Frank McCloskey, according to the
credentials issued by Indiana, and for some reason McCloskey had not filed an
FCEA contest.381 Nevertheless, Democratic soon-to-be Majority Leader Jim
Wright moved for the seat to be declared vacant pending a House-run recount
of the district.382 Wright tried to make his resolution sound routine, but it
actually flouted precedent, following only the 1961 disputed-election case (also
from Indiana) of Chambers and Roush, which Wright characterized as “very
similar, in fact almost identical” to McIntyre’s case.383 Wright conceded that
McIntyre’s credentials would ordinarily entitle him to be seated, but he
complained that Indiana’s counting and recounting process had been so
inadequate that it was appropriate to disregard McIntyre’s credentials.384
Soon-to-be-Minority Leader Robert Michel pushed back, citing Powell v.
McCormack for the notion that qualified, credentialed members should not be
turned away.385 Republican Representative William Thomas noted that in
eighty-one of the eighty-two elections contested since 1933, the credentialed
member-elect was seated at organization; Chambers was the sole exception.386
378. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 294–95; infra
Section IV.B.
379. See 117 CONG. REC. 9–13 (1971); 119 id. at 11–13 (1973); 121 id. at 16–19 (1975); 123 id.
at 49–52 (1977); 125 id. at 3–6 (1979); 127 id. at 93–97 (1981); 129 id. at 29–33 (1983).
380. See 131 id. at 380 (1985). The objection to Stallings may have been a tit-for-tat response
to the objection to McIntyre. See id. at 390–91.
381. See id. at 382 (comments of Rep. Michel) (complaining that McCloskey had not filed an
FCEA contest).
382. See id. at 381.
383. Id.; see supra Section III.D.i.
384. 131 CONG. REC. 381 (1985).
385. See id. at 382.
386. See id. Thomas tried to distinguish the Chambers case by saying that in Chambers’s case
“there was a question of the certification,” because the Indiana secretary of state had changed his mind
and sent in a statement that the original certification had been in error. Id. at 382–83. But Chambers’s
credentials were not clouded in that way; Thomas was simply incorrect in his characterization of the
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But neither cited the distinction between challenges to qualifications and
challenges to election contests, the latter of which was supposed to be a less
appropriate basis for refusing to seat a credentialed member-elect at
organization.387
The Republicans were clearly angry.388 One even offered that the
Republicans “came very close to asking the entire House to stand aside from
the swearing-in,” a reminder that the Step Aside process plays with fire (or at
least disorder).389 But in the end all that mattered was that the Democrats had
the votes. McIntyre’s seat was left vacant pending the House’s final resolution
of the recount.390 For the purposes of this Article, the point is that McIntyre
being forced to stand aside at organization was not the issue; the battle lines had
moved entirely to the fight over whether credentialed members should be seated
pending committee proceedings, or if instead the Chambers and McIntyre
precedents were the new norm.
Stallings’s case came up next. The Republicans, surely realizing that they
lacked the votes needed to exact any sort of recompense, took the higher ground
and joined with Democrats to unanimously approve Stallings’s immediate
seating.391 Doing so gave them an opportunity to highlight all of the reasons
why they thought Stallings’s election was more questionable than McIntyre’s
while nevertheless calling for consistency with precedent, which meant seating
Stallings pending final consideration of his case.392 It also meant tweaking
Democrats for their inconsistency and partisanship that day.393

1961 case. See supra Section III.D.i. A later committee report set the record straight on this point.
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-58, at 3 n.5 (1985). Before that, though, several other representatives repeated
Thomas’s error. See 131 CONG. REC. 383–86 (1985) (comments of Reps. Myers, Hunter, Vander Jagt,
and Frenzel). Representative Vander Jagt compounded his error by saying, “Never before in history
has a candidate certified by the duly constituted authority of that State as a winner been asked to stand
aside pending the outcome of an admittedly controversial recount.” Id. at 385. As Part III of this
Article has described, numerous people had been forced to step aside during the oath because of
election contests—most recently Blackburn in 1967. See supra text accompanying note 349. Even if
by “asked to stand aside” Vander Jagt meant the House voting to declare the seat vacant, that had
happened before too, in the infamous 1839 New Jersey case. See supra Section III.A.iv.
387. See supra note 251; supra text accompanying notes 332, 343, 354.
388. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 385–86 (1985) (comments of Rep. Vander Jagt) (calling the
Democratic action “an act of injustice so grievous that it will permeate our deliberations throughout
the rest of this 99th Congress” and saying that it “would create a stench that will permeate our every
deliberation”).
389. Id. at 386 (comments of Rep. Frenzel).
390. See id. at 387–88.
391. See id. at 391–92.
392. See id. at 388–91.
393. See id. at 388–89.
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In the end, after a lengthy and controversial recount, the House awarded the
seat to McCloskey.394 The fight over the “Bloody Eighth” did a lot of damage,
and it was an important episode in Congress’s descent from its previous
(relative) collegiality to the increasingly bare-knuckled partisanship of recent
decades.395 To be sure, the damage was probably done more by the final
recount than by the House’s failure to provisionally seat McIntyre at
organization. But the latter certainly did not help. As a group, politicians are
not known for being eager to own up to their mistakes. Nevertheless, it is
striking that in the three decades since the Bloody Eighth nobody has forced a
representative-elect to step aside from the oath at organization.396
E. The Modern Era Part II: The Second Coming?
The dormancy of the Step Aside process has not been because of a lack of
opportunities; there have been numerous election contests in the House since
1985.397 In its current form, the Step Aside process is used only when the race
being challenged is not the subject of an election contest under the FCEA,
which is rare.398 There have also been challenges to the qualifications of a
member-elect, but none were raised before the oath, let alone as the basis for
demanding that a member-elect step aside.399 Indeed, since 1985 there have
been more kerfuffles about Speaker elections than about letting members-elect
take their oaths.400
At the 2021 organization, Representative-Elect Chip Roy challenged the
seating of sixty-seven representatives-elect: the entire delegations of Arizona,

394. See WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 40.
395. See Meet the Press Daily (MSNBC television broadcast, May 26, 2017) (transcript available
at MTP Daily, Transcript 5/26/2017, MSNBC, https://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/mtp-daily/201705-26-msna1011106) [https://perma.cc/77RD-272J] (calling the Bloody Eighth the “Patient Zero” of
the hyper-partisan win-at-all-costs environment on Capitol Hill).
396. See 133 CONG. REC. 1–3 (1987); 135 id. at 66–71 (1989); 137 id. at 35–38 (1991); 139 id.
at 45–48 (1993); 141 id. at 439–46 (1995); 143 id. at 114–20 (1997); 145 id. at 41–45 (1999); 147 id.
at 19–23 (2001); 149 id. at 1–6 (2003); 151 id. at 36–41 (2005); 153 id. at 1–5 (2007); 155 id. at 1–5
(2009); 157 id. at 74–79 (2011); 159 id. at 20–24 (2013); 161 id. at 28–33 (2015); 163 id. at H1–6
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 2017); 165 id. at H1–7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2019); 167 id. at H7–8 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
2021).
397. See WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 41–48 (describing cases up to 2009).
398. In 1997, it was noted that an FCEA challenge had been filed against Representative-Elect
Loretta Sanchez, “[i]n lieu of requesting [her] to step aside.” 143 CONG. REC. 120 (1997). A similar
non-objection—noting before the oath that there was a contest, but pointedly not asking the contestee
to stand aside—occurred in 2007. See 153 id. at 5 (2007).
399. See, e.g., WHITAKER, supra note 316, at 32, 46 n.29 (describing Stokes and McCrery cases).
400. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 115–16 (1997); 145 id. at 43 (1999).
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Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.401 Roy, a
Republican, was calling out his fellow Republicans who intended to challenge
the presidential-election results in those states—he was implying that if the
presidential results could not be trusted then neither could the House results.402
Roy was only trying to make a point; the unsworn members immediately voted
371–2, with Roy in the majority, to direct the Speaker to swear in all memberselect.403 No one was forced to step aside. Nevertheless, Roy’s objection ended
the House’s longest stretch without pre-oath objections since the initial one
from 1789 through 1833.
Perhaps this lengthy lull reflects that the House now appreciates the
awkwardness, pointlessness, and incorrectness of forcing representatives-elect
with valid credentials to step aside. As this Article has shown, the Step Aside
process was born at a time when members swore in state-by-state; they no
longer do. It flourished in a time when the House thought that it could exclude
people from office for reasons other than the constitutional qualifications of
age, residency, and citizenship; the Supreme Court has made clear that it
cannot. It is used as an alternative to the FCEA process for contesting
elections—something for which no alternative is really needed. In short, the
Step Aside process is useless, and maybe the House finally recognizes that.
That said, the House has shown many times before that its past performance
is no guarantee of future results. And regardless, the dearth of members-elect
being forced to step aside presents a good opportunity to pause and reflect.
What should the House do the next time a serious challenge does arise to a
member-elect’s election or qualifications? Specifically, how might the Step
Aside process be rejected and buried?
IV. PROPOSAL
This Article proposes that the House reestablish the Oaths First process: the
House should exercise its membership-judging powers only after all members
with valid credentials have been seated and sworn in. More to the point, the
House should repudiate any attempt to use the Step Aside process. This would
protect the legitimacy and promote the efficiency of the seating process. It
would conform best to historical practice, and it would be consistent with the
text and structure of the Constitution.
401. See 167 id. at H7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2021).
402. See Ryan Autullo, Responding to Challenges of Biden’s Victory, Chip Roy Objects to
Seating of Fellow Representatives, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/01/03/rep-chip-roy-objects-representatives-challengingbidens-win/4122566001 [https://perma.cc/6PZV-H5PX].
403. See 167 CONG. REC. H7–H8 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2021).
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A. The Baseline
This Article’s proposed process for House organization is simple and tracks
what the House almost always does anyway. The Clerk places all people with
valid credentials on the roll of representatives-elect. At organization, those on
the roll vote for Speaker.404 Then, those appearing on the roll take the oath of
office, and with that take their seats. If anybody wishes to challenge a memberelect’s election or qualifications, they can do so after that, when the House has
fully become the House.
B. The Federal Contested Elections Act
Some accounts of the Step Aside process depict it as a way to give the
House jurisdiction over an election challenge when there is not a formal contest
under the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA).405 This is particularly
relevant for qualifications challenges, which the FCEA does not cover.
But there is no inherent reason to employ the Step Aside process this way.
Election challenges outside the FCEA process are rare406—and should be, given
that the FCEA is an adequate system for adjudicating election disputes. There
is no compelling need to allow an alternative avenue for election challenges.
And regardless, being sworn in does not make a member’s election (or
qualifications) unchallengeable. Indeed, under House Rule IX, such challenges
are privileged and can be raised at any time as a matter of top priority.407 While
it might be marginally less disruptive to limit non-FCEA challenges to those
announced before the oath, disruption is already minimized by the House’s
presumption that credentialed people will hold their seat until and unless a
contestant proves that they should not.

404. In some ways it is problematic for unsworn members-elect to vote for Speaker. See supra
text accompanying note 40. But that is a topic for another day given that the Step Aside Process
typically (and weirdly) is applied only after objected-to members-elect have already voted in the
Speaker election. If the House follows the procedures suggested by this Article, it will not make any
functional difference when the Speaker vote occurs, because the voting population will be the same
immediately before and immediately after the oath is administered. Moreover, an unbroken line of
precedent, dating back to the very First Congress, has seen organizing Houses vote for Speaker before
doing anything else. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. While the cautionary example of 1839
did not prevent the Step Aside process from taking hold, it was the last time the Speaker election was
disrupted by membership disputes in that way. See supra Section III.A.iv.
405. 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96; see supra text accompanying notes 32, 378.
406. See supra note 32.
407. See CHERYL L. JOHNSON, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (2021), https://
rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/117-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6YN-CFGP]; HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 701, at 425; see also 3 HINDS, supra note 14,
§§ 2579–87, at 1068–72.
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Disrupting the House’s organization never needs to be part of the challenge
process. If it wanted to, the House simply could require non-FCEA objections
to be registered immediately after the oath in order to be timely. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, even if there were a good reason to make pre-oath
objections a way to give the House jurisdiction over a matter, there is no logical
reason to require that the challenged member-elect step aside. In other words,
if the point is that there must be a timely objection, then the objection alone
should be enough.408
C. Making it Happen
The problem with the Step Aside process is not that it happens every two
years; it doesn’t. The problem is that it lingers as a possibility. House precedent
is that unsworn members can force individual colleagues to step aside,
regardless of how often they actually use that power. As such, establishing this
Article’s proposal will require affirmatively repudiating the Step Aside process,
not just continuing the current streak of dormancy. Such a repudiation will
require the majority party to be ready and willing to act the next time a memberelect attempts to force another member-elect to step aside.
When a challenger requests someone to step aside, precedent—which the
parliamentarian and the Speaker will almost certainly follow409—will dictate
that the Speaker ask the objected-to member-elect to do so. This could be
prevented by someone else moving to proceed immediately to the
administration of the oath,410 but that would not undo the precedent. What
would undo it is someone appealing the Speaker’s ruling, arguing that all
members-elect with facially valid credentials stand on equal ground and should
take the oath together.411 An appeal would allow for discussion (with the
appellant’s side following the arguments raised in this Article) and a positive
vote by the assemblage to overturn the Step Aside precedent and restore the
Oaths First precedent.

408. See supra text accompanying note 296.
409. See Jonathan S. Gould, Law Within Congress, 129 YALE L.J. 1946, 1965 (2020) (noting
that the presiding officer in the House unfailingly follows the Parliamentarian’s rulings); id. at 1982–
84 (explaining that the Parliamentarian adheres to a strict form of stare decisis regarding House
precedent).
410. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 403.
411. See Gould, supra note 409, at 1966, 1999 (explaining that a House vote on an appeal from
the chair’s ruling represents the highest level of House precedential weight); cf. GAIL E. BAITINGER,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30787, PARLIAMENTARY REFERENCE SOURCES: HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 3 (2019) (noting infrequency of successful appeals).
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A precedent like this is not binding in the same way that, say, legislation is
(not that legislation is a viable option).412 There would be nothing preventing
a future majority from repudiating the Oaths First precedent again in the future.
But a vote of the entire body carries greater precedential weight than does the
sort of ad hockery associated with the construction and use of the Step Aside
process.413 Making a clear, firm statement against the Step Aside process and
in favor of the Oaths First process would improve the precedential landscape
considerably.
D. Credentials
Saying that everyone with proper credentials should take the oath presumes
that it is obvious who has proper credentials. It might not be obvious, though,
and robust procedures have to account for that possibility.
Two people might appear at organization, both claiming their credentials
are valid.414 If two people seem to have credentials for the same seat—
credentials that would suffice if only one person appeared with them—then
neither can claim a right to take the oath. In such a situation, neither claimant
should be added to the roll, and the seat should remain vacant until the House
can resolve the dispute.
But the mere presence of a second person waving around documents need
not keep a legitimate winner off of the roll. Sometimes the case will be clear
enough for the Clerk (or failing that, the proto-House) to recognize as a
ministerial matter that one and only one set of valid credentials has been
properly executed under state law. The current process—featuring dialogue
between the Clerk’s office and the state well in advance of organization—
usually provides more than enough time for state officials and courts to sort out
who the winner is and convey that information to the Clerk.415 Certification is

412. Legislation, while providing more clarity, is a tricky proposition here. It probably cannot
“govern the House as to its rules or its organization.” 5 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 6765, at 889 (1907). Procedural matters that
are given to the House alone to judge (as the elections, returns, and qualifications of House members
are) are probably up to the House alone to decide via its internal rules. Regardless, this is not the sort
of issue that would be likely to spur a successful, proactive legislative effort anyway.
413. See supra note 411.
414. The most recent such case occurred in 1893. See supra text accompanying notes 231–32.
415. See supra Section II.B. Elections are sometimes close or disputed enough that the state has
not declared a winner by the time the House term begins. See, e.g., Luis Ferré-Sadurní, New York
Republican Wins Final House Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2021, at A14 (discussing New York’s TwentySecond District in the 2020 election).
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a matter of the state’s communication with the Clerk, not a matter of individuals
appearing in the Capitol wielding papers and making claims.416
E. Multiple Disputes
The most significant complication is when multiple seats are in dispute. As
a practical matter, this is the only situation in which there is any practical
difference between the Step Aside process and the Oaths First process. If there
is only one person being challenged, the decision-making body is the same
under either procedure: everyone except the person being challenged. The
timing is almost identical as well. But if there are multiple challenges, the Oaths
First process allows challenged members to vote on other challenged members’
cases. By contrast, the Step Aside process precludes the subjects of some
challenges from voting on other challenges.
To be precise, a challenged member’s voting power could be limited under
the Oaths First process too. The precise difference is important. Under the Step
Aside process, those who fend off a challenge successfully will be seated and
can then vote on subsequent challenges. They would be precluded only from
voting on challenges decided before their own. But the House’s decision to
seat them suggests that their presence is unobjectionable, so it is problematic
that they will have been barred from voting on other challenges handled just
minutes earlier. This also incentivizes tit-for-tat challenges, because challenges
under the Step Aside process are considered in the order in which they were
made.417 Because the subject of Challenge 2 is not able to vote on Challenge
1, leveling Challenge 2 (and 3 and 4 . . .) is a way to stack the deck for the vote
on Challenge 1.
By contrast, under the Oaths First process, those who lose a challenge are
unseated and precluded from voting on challenges decided after their own. This
is unproblematic, as they have just been adjudged unworthy. If there is a
problem, it is that they were able to participate in previous votes. But if the
latter is a problem, it has plenty of company—under both the Oaths First and
Step Aside processes, unseated members will have voted for Speaker.418
Moreover, in cases where members are seated provisionally and unseated much
later after a lengthy investigation, they will have been voting on all manner of
legislation in the meantime. By comparison, the effect of the Oaths First
process is much milder.
The presence of multiple challenges also raises some technical issues. One
is the question of how far the principle against voting on one’s own dispute
416. See supra Section II.B.
417. See 1 HINDS, supra note 14, § 149, at 91–92; HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 203, at 88.
418. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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extends. It is a venerable principle of Anglo-American law that a person should
not be a judge in his or her own case.419 The most basic consequence of this
tenet is that a member should not vote on whether he or she should be seated.420
But this principle may extend to votes on other members’ cases, particularly
when those other cases are rooted in the same set of facts. For example, suppose
that the government of a state is accused of improperly excluding a certain
category of ballots from its vote totals, with the result that three U.S. House
districts flip from the Purple Party to the Silver Party. When it considers the
dispute, the House might consider the three disputed districts en masse, with
none of the three challenged Silver representatives participating. But if the
House considers the disputes one district at a time, all three should still be
precluded from voting in any of the three cases. Having them vote in each
other’s cases would be tantamount to having them vote in their own, because
they would be ruling on the very facts at issue in their own cases. (There is,
admittedly, analogous precedent to the contrary, allowing such
participation.421) Other than that, though, challenged members should be able
to vote on challenges to other members’ qualifications, election results, or
credentials.
A second technical issue concerns the timing of challenges and votes. If
there is ever again a case of inadequate credentials, the House should decide it
first, before the oath if necessary. Valid credentials are the foundation of the
entire system. By deciding these cases first, the House can ensure that the
decision-making body is properly constituted.
What comes first after the oath—qualifications cases or election cases—
matters much less, and it is probably fine to adapt the current practice of
considering cases in the order in which they are raised. That said, it might make
sense to handle qualifications cases first. These will typically involve simpler
issues of fact (such as the date on which a member was born or became a
citizen) than disputed elections (which tend to be highly fact-intensive and
entail examining large numbers of ambiguous votes). Moreover, a member

419. See Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardon,
106 YALE L.J. 779, 806–07 (1996) (discussing this presumption).
420. See 5 HINDS, supra note 14, § 5949, at 502; HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 376, at 200.
To be precise, House precedent dictates that it is up to individual representatives themselves to decide
whether their personal interest in a vote is such that they should not participate; the House’s power to
limit such an individual’s power to vote is “doubtful.” 5 HINDS, supra note 14, §§ 5950–52, at 503–
04; HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, ch. 58, § 8, at 943–44; cf. Kalt, supra note 419, at 796 & n.105
(collecting examples of self-restraint in expulsion cases).
421. See 5 HINDS, supra note 14, § 5958, at 508 (presenting an 1844 case in which members of
a state delegation facing a common legal challenge were able to vote on seating each other); see also
BARTLETT, supra note 77, at 47–69 (providing a full account of the case).
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voting, but later being unseated, is more objectionable when the problem was
qualifications (such that the member’s presence was objectively illegitimate)
versus a disputed election (in which case the member’s presence was officially
certified based on preliminary data to be entitled to the seat).
F. A Concluding Caveat
No political system is completely incorruptible, so it still would be possible
for undemocratic results to take place under this Article’s proposal. For
example, if a corrupt state government certifies candidates who did not actually
win, there is no guarantee that a House majority will later vote to unseat the
bogus members. On the flip side, a House majority might exclude and unseat
members by falsely “judging” them to be unqualified.
But no system can guarantee that it will avoid such problems. More to the
point, this Article’s proposal is only about the timing of the House’s
membership decisions, not the merits of those decisions. Compared to the Step
Aside process, the Oaths First process adds protection against abuses by selfdealing representatives. To the extent that the Oaths First process does not
prevent shenanigans, neither does the Step Aside process. No House rule—on
any subject—can eliminate the possibility that a majority of the House will
choose to do the wrong thing.
V. PRINCIPLES
This Article’s notion that all representatives-elect with valid credentials
should take the oath together, and that challenges to anyone’s qualifications or
electoral victory should wait until after that, touches on several principles.
Among them are constitutional doctrines like federalism and the House’s
authority over judging its own membership, as well as more practical principles
such as precedent, pre-commitment strategies, and restraint.
A. Constitutional Principles
i. Federalism
There is a federalist tension inherent in the system of House elections.
States have general authority to administer the elections and certify the winners,
but Congress can swoop in however it sees fit to regulate the elections’ time,
place, and manner.422 Similarly, while Congress has chosen largely to leave it
to the states to count votes and declare winners, the House’s authority to judge

422. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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its own elections allows it to overrule state results using standards of its own
choosing.423
The House almost never does this, of course.424 One reason is that recounts
require tremendous energy and resources, so it makes sense to avoid
redundancy by relying on the states to the greatest extent possible. But another
reason is simply that the House respects the role of the states. This is especially
so at organization. From the First Congress through today, members-elect vote
for Speaker and swear in based on their states having declared that they won
their elections.
While the House can and does second-guess state
determinations, it must have a starting point—and it relies on states to provide
that starting point.
Even if Congress decided to fully federalize the election process, taking
election administration completely out of the states’ hands, the House still
would not have control over its initial membership list. Rather, that control
would likely go to whatever federal executive-branch entity was put in charge
of administering congressional elections. The House would rely on the
executive branch, not the states; there is no way to avoid the need to rely on
some agent external to Congress.
In sum, there is no federalism-based imperative in the Constitution that
requires the states to play such a crucial role in determining who will swear in
on the day the House organizes itself. There is, however, a requirement that
somebody play that role. That it is the states who do so is consistent with
federalism—constitutionally comfortable even if not constitutionally
mandated.
ii. The House’s Constitutional Authority
After all members with facially valid credentials have been seated, and thus
the House has been properly constituted, the House can turn to judging the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members. At that point, it has
unquestionably become the “House” that is the judge “of its own Members.”425
Using this power, it can unseat members by a simple majority vote; it need not
rely on its expulsion power, which requires a two-thirds majority.

423. See id. § 5, cl. 1; cf. Lisa Marshall Manheim, Judging Congressional Elections, 51 GA. L.
REV. 359 (2017) (noting ambiguity and tensions surrounding the role of state courts vis-à-vis Congress
in adjudicating election disputes).
424. But see supra Sections III.D.i and III.D.iii.
425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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a. Judging Elections, Returns, and Qualifications
Any system for determining the House’s proper membership will
necessarily rely on the states and on the House’s unelected Clerk. The states
administer elections and certify the winners. The Clerk assembles the roll of
representatives-elect, and represents the eternal flame of House authority that
provides for some continuity at organization.
But the Constitution
unambiguously designates the House—not the states, and not the Clerk—as the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.426 It is thus
critical that the House retain ultimate authority.
The role of the states in forming the House’s initial set of members was
discussed above.427 There is an important distinction between members’ initial
right to swear in and take a seat, and their final right to that seat. The House
has always recognized this distinction, and it is entirely consistent with the
notion of the House as judge. When functioning properly, the states’ electoral
apparatuses supply that which the House judges. Even though the Oaths First
process defers so much to states in the first instance, the House’s proper role is
preserved as long as the House gets the last word and can scrutinize, recount,
or undo the states’ determinations as it sees fit.428
The Clerk’s role requires some intermediate judging in cases where the
credentials forwarded by a state are not perfectly regular. When the Clerk
exercises her statutory authority to draw up the roll of representatives-elect,
marginal cases may require her to exercise discretion. At the very least, she
must scrutinize credentials enough to determine if they represent such a
marginal case. Here too, though, the answer is that this is acceptable as long as
the Clerk is only affecting the initial right to swear in and the House retains the
ultimate authority to judge.
To be sure, there is still room for trouble and mischief. States could
administer their elections and recounts malevolently or ineptly. A scheming or
bumbling Clerk could tip the balance of power in Congress by including or
omitting people from the roll that she should not. The House’s ability to redress
such things would be hampered by the fact that the “House” making the
decisions would be the skewed one that the states and the Clerk constituted
incorrectly. In fending off the Etheridge Plot in 1863, the proto-House got
around this by holding votes to amend the roll, before anyone had taken the
oath.429 While crucial in such cases, such votes are problematic, as they open
426. Id.
427. See supra Section V.A.i.
428. Cf. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1972) (expressing similar sentiments
regarding the Senate’s power to judge the elections of its members).
429. See supra text accompanying notes 146–48.
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the door to all manner of undesirable second-guessing of honest election
results.430
To the extent that the House cannot help but rely on the states and the Clerk,
it can at least make the process of forming the roll of representatives-elect as
well-defined as possible—so that the states’ and Clerk’s roles are as purely
ministerial as possible. The current process achieves this goal fairly well.431
This still leaves open the question of who the “House” is that judges the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. The Step Aside process
defines the House as newly elected members whose elections, returns, or
qualifications have not been challenged by anyone. This standard is
problematic. It relies on the good faith of those present—reliance that will not
always be reasonable. One unsworn member’s decision to level a challenge
should not help define who the “House” is here. And it might not be just one
challenge; there could be a cascade.432 A system in which individuals can keep
out members simply by registering an objection is undemocratic.
To be sure, no would-be House majority is likely to sit back and allow a
minority to take over via the Step Aside process. The majority would likely
hold pre-oath votes to fend off such a challenge, as it did in 1863.433 But
resorting to such votes is suboptimal, especially given that the House is not
supposed to “enter[] on any other business” before the oath is administered.434
Rather than say blithely that the majority can clean up such a mess if push
comes to shove, it is better to use a process that avoids the mess, the pushing,
and the shoving in the first place.
When the Constitution says that the House judges its own membership, at
organization the “House” should include all of its credentialed members, sworn
in. This means minimizing judging and challenges before that point. That, in
turn, means giving equal treatment to everyone with valid credentials, and not
letting individual objections remove anybody from the group—the Oaths First
process, in other words.

430. One possible alternative would be for the lame-duck House to oversee the compilation of
the succeeding House’s roll. The old House would be a full, sworn, legitimate body, unlike the
unsworn proto-House and unlike the unelected Clerk. But relying on the outgoing House would fit
uncomfortably in our democratic system. In particular, if the lame-duck House had the power to rule
on incoming legislators, members could illegitimately entrench themselves in power by corruptly
“judging” disputed election returns in their own favor.
431. See supra Section II.B.
432. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 209–18 (describing 1881 organization, in which
eight members-elect had to step aside, including two tit-for-tat challenges).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 146–48.
434. 2 U.S.C. § 25.
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b. Exclusion Versus Expulsion
Some of the difficulty in timing votes on exclusion—a term generally used
to refer to qualifications challenges but not election challenges435—has
stemmed from the awkwardness of seating members only to unseat them later.
This awkwardness stems in part from the House’s parallel power to “punish its
Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds,
expel a Member.”436 In some exclusion cases, it was argued that once members
take their seats only expulsion can turn them out, and that expulsion can only
reach conduct during the term, not before the election.437 As such, this
argument claims, if members lack some qualification, it is essential that they
not be seated in the first place.
This understanding was never correct, and its incorrectness was powerfully
reinforced by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack.438 It was never
correct because the House, from its very beginning, has judged the
qualifications (and elections) of its members after they had been seated, and
done so by simple majority vote.439 Seated members have always been subject
to being unseated later upon a demonstration that they were unqualified (or that
their election opponent was the rightful winner).440 This never required
expulsion by a two-thirds majority.
The false dichotomy between exclusion and expulsion broke down even
further in Powell when the Court clarified that the House cannot erect its own,
new qualifications for office.441 If the House can turn out someone like
Brigham Roberts, Victor Berger, or Adam Clayton Powell for being a criminal,
it matters a lot if the Constitution restricts the timing of that action. It also
matters whether it is done through exclusion by a simple majority or expulsion
by a two-thirds majority. Once Powell made it clear that exclusion was not
available to keep criminals out of Congress, these problems melted away; it
became clear that expulsion by two-thirds was the only option (it also appeared
that expulsion could reach beyond acts committed during the term442).
435. See 2 DESCHLER, supra note 31, at ch. 9, § 17, at 1023; WHITAKER, supra note 27 at 9.
436. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
437. See supra note 245; supra text accompanying note 357.
438. 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
439. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–51 (detailing the first such case).
440. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130, 227 (noting some such cases, among many
others); Salamanca & Keller, supra note 12, at 296 (describing this as the typical practice of
legislatures).
441. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 550; supra text accompanying notes 367–69.
442. See HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 13, at ch. 25, § 20, at 533 (noting that the House’s
expulsion power “has been said to be unlimited” and can extend to acts that are “[]related to status as
a Member [and] to public trust and duty” but not noting any timing limits).
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While it seems as though only someone who has been seated can be
expelled (one must be in before one can be thrown out),443 the converse is not
true for exclusion. Nowhere does the Constitution say that exclusion is limited
only to those who have not yet been seated. True, the word “exclusion” might
carry that connotation (i.e., one cannot be kept out if one is already in). But the
Constitution does not actually use the word “exclusion” here. What the
Constitution says is that each house judges the qualifications of its members.444
It provides no guidance, let alone restrictions, regarding the proper timing of
that judging.
It would be strange if the House had no power to unseat a person who took
the oath of office as a representative and was discovered only later to be
underage, or a noncitizen, or the beneficiary of a massive electoral tallying
error. It would also be strange to protect such a person with the supermajority
requirement reserved for cases of expulsion. If disqualifying facts come to light
after a representative takes office, the House can exercise its constitutional duty
and judge the member’s election or qualifications as applicable. Should the
House believe that the member is not entitled to the seat, it makes sense for that
the member to be turned out by a simple majority vote.
One additional objection regarding the exclusion of already seated
members is that they might have participated in the legislative process already.
They even might have cast the deciding vote on a bill. If, a few months into a
term, a representative is excluded because all along he or she lacked the
required qualifications, would the House have to re-vote on all of the bills that
had been approved? No. Given that the House is the judge of the qualifications
of its members, a duly enrolled representative presumptively is qualified and
duly elected until the moment that the House declares otherwise and excludes
him or her. The House has never undone legislative acts on grounds that a
member who participated was later unseated.
B. Practical Considerations
i. Precedent
Congressional precedent does not function in the same way as judicial
precedent, and congressional practice regarding the timing of seating
challenges at organization is a good example of that. As described in Part II of
this Article, the Step Aside process evolved through the disregard of precedent

443. But see 2 HINDS, supra note 14, § 1262, at 813 (describing case of John B. Clark, expelled
without having shown up to be sworn in).
444. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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(or, when precedent was considered, through under-explained and poorly
reasoned applications of it).
In some sense, the main concern at present is the opposite: an unthinking
overreliance on precedent. The past three decades have seen the House do
things right. When there have been objections to a member-elect’s election, the
objectors have noted those objections but not forced the members-elect to stand
aside during the oath.445 The problem is that inaction does not register as a
precedent in the same way that action does. If, in the future, an objector wants
to force another member-elect to stand aside, the objector will still be able to
cite dozens of Step Aside precedents.446
But if the House carefully evaluates those precedents it will have good
reason to reject them. In part, this is because of how many of the precedents
are discredited: the 1839 debacle;447 the Roberts,448 Berger,449 and Powell450
cases; and most recently the destructive McIntyre case.451 The only cases that
are not (in retrospect) obvious mistakes are those in which the objectee was
forced to stand aside, but was voted on and seated immediately after the oath.
While those precedents are not discredited as such, they reveal the uselessness
of pre-oath objections—in all of those cases, nothing was accomplished but
delay.
The Step Aside process’s origin is also rooted in a problem that no longer
exists. It used to be that members-elect were sworn in by state delegation.452
When there were challenges to individual members-elect, some of their wouldbe colleagues had been sworn in already, but others had not been. By putting
the challenged people at the end of the line, the House ensured that everyone
else would be sworn in before any votes were taken. This was never as good a
solution as the Oaths First process would have been, but it has made no sense
at all since members began swearing in en masse in 1929.453 Now that everyone
swears in at once instead of state by state, pre-oath objections offer no benefit.
They can only slow things down.

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

See supra Section III.E.
See supra Section III.B-III.D.
See supra Section III.A.iv.
See supra Section III.C.i.
See supra text accompanying notes 277–83.
See supra Section III.D.ii.
See supra Section III.D.iii.
See supra note 125.
See supra note 312.
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ii. Pre-Commitment and Restraint
From a policy standpoint, one great advantage of the Oaths First process is
the value of pre-commitment. If both sides are bound in advance to allow
anyone with valid credentials to swear in, then neither side will have any reason
to manipulate the House organization process or to fear that the other side will
do so. If the Step Aside process lingers as a possibility, by contrast, both sides
will have an incentive to make strategically timed objections. Particularly when
the House is closely divided, the possibility of rancor and chaos will loom over
every organization.
In the long history of the House, parties have almost always restrained
themselves from such strategic actions. At best, this could be a result of a sense
of honor, decorum, and fairness prevailing. But when things have broken
down—as in 1839, 1863, 1961 and 1985—the limits of those virtues have
become suddenly and painfully evident. Currently, levels of partisanship in
Congress are so high that it is hard to have much confidence in the parties’ selfrestraint.
Sometimes, extreme division actually encourages restraint, of the “mutually
assured destruction” variety. Tit-for-tat objections would be easy to perpetrate
and hard to repair, and both parties know that the other side stands ready to
defend itself. But while this mitigates the risk of disaster, it does not eliminate
it. More to the point, it does nothing to actually justify the Step Aside process,
given that the Oaths First process would eliminate the possibility of any such
shenanigans. In other words, however low one thinks the risk posed by the Step
Aside process is, it is a needless risk.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anyone making a list of problems to solve in the House of Representatives
surely would have no shortage of priorities to list ahead of the Step Aside
precedent. But restoring the Oaths First precedent and returning the House to
its first, best practice would require little effort. It would pose no disadvantage.
The risk presented by the Step Aside process might seem remote, but it is still
worth dispelling at the next opportunity.

